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F R O M  T H E  E D I T O R
I
n each issue, Hemisphere attempts to tackle critical issues affecting the Americas. In recent 
years, our readers have requested m ore in-depth discussion of a single topic from a variety of 
viewpoints. In the last two issues, therefore, we have shifted our form at to include a central 
core of articles about a specific topic. We have also attem pted to move the magazine toward a 
m ore graphics intensive format. I hope you find our new format m ore appealing and our arti­
cles informative and challenging.
In this issue we focus on neoliberalism or, as some may prefer to call it, market-oriented reforms. 
T hroughout Latin America and the Caribbean these reforms have entered into a critical second 
phase. Neoliberalism's harshest critics point to the exacerbation o f inequality and the spread of 
poverty, crime and general social degradation. Supporters of the reforms note the end of hyperinfla­
tion, the restoration of economic growth, and an increase in large-scale foreign direct investment.
We have invited a select group of scholars and journalists to examine this debate by focusing on some 
of the central themes of the neoliberal agenda, including administrative decentralization, privatiza­
tion and free trade.
The issue begins with commentaries by journalists Howard LaFranchi and Andres Oppenheimer, 
who report on the general economic and social impacts of market reform in Latin America and the 
left’s attem pt to formulate an alternative to neoliberalism.
The features section includes a special forum  on privatization, a key tenet of neoliberal reform.
The three articles devoted to this topic address the course and outcome of privatization in Bolivia, 
Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. Also in this section, photojournalist Janet Jarm an discusses attempts to 
regulate the environmental impact of free trade along the US-Mexican border, and Allan Rosenbaum 
traces efforts to strengthen local governm ent in different municipalities across Latin America.
Hemisphere’s reports section broadens the issue’s focus with articles relating to other topics of inter­
est in the Americas. In this issue, George Grayson discusses the future prospects of Mexico’s ruling 
party, and Gary Brana-Shute provides an account of his experience as an elections observer in 
Jamaica.
Photo essays have become an im portant part of Hemisphere. We believe that images have the power 
to depict a certain point of view, and tell a story that articles may not be able to convey in words. We 
have published the works of outstanding young photographers from around the Americas, and in this 
issue we are delighted to share with you Ricardo Funari’s dramatic photo essay on labor exploitation 
in rural Brazil. His depiction of workers in the sugar, rubber and charcoal industries points to the 
harsh realities of life in contem porary Latin America.
Finally, I would like to introduce our new managing editor, Alisa Newman. Alisa holds an MA in 
Latin American history from the University of Texas-Austin and has editorial experience with a variety 
of publications.
For the past decade, Hemisphere's objective has been to prom ote an intelligent debate on a broad 
range of issues affecting the Americas. We urge you to write and share with us your views on the mag­
azine and specific articles in this and previous issues.
Eduardo A. Gamarra
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C O M M E
Staying the Course
H ow ard LaFranchi
D
uring a Buenos Aires 
protest march last year 
against President 
Carlos M enem’s 
neoliberal economic 
program, the usual 
jeers and cries were suddenly rivaled 
by a new chant. “Bucaram! 
Bucaram!” the crowd howled in uni­
son.
Far from a cry of support for 
Ecuador’s deposed president, the 
crowd’s chant referred to Bucaram’s 
fate after implementing stringent 
neoliberal economic reforms. As 
such, it was a warning to Argentina’s 
leaders that the same end could 
befall them if they persist on the 
same course. Menem got a rude 
shock after the Congressional elec­
tions of October 1997, when the left- 
of-center Alianza party gained con­
trol of the legislature after a cam­
paign that criticized the president’s 
economic policy and its effect on 
average Argentines. This policy 
amounts to a fairly classic package of 
neoliberal economic reforms: curb­
ing inflation with tight fiscal policies, 
downsizing the state, selling off pub­
lic companies in favor of private 
enterprises and opening up heavily 
protected domestic markets to glob­
al competition.
The shouts of “Bucaram!
Bucaram!”reflect the growing impa­
tience across Latin America with a 
decade or so of economic reforms, 
depending on the country in ques­
tion. Those reforms have ushered in 
unquestionable benefits, chief
Howard LaFranchi is a Mexico and 
Latin America correspondent for the 
Christian Science Monitor in Mexico 
City.
among these the toppling of infla­
tion. At the same time, however, 
reform programs have been less suc­
cessful at improving economic and 
social conditions for a wider spec­
trum  of the population. Critics 
charge that while the macroeconom­
ic indicators achieved by neoliberal 
administrations are often impressive, 
the gains have not trickled down to 
those who need them most.
Latin Americans will not soon for­
get the years when inflation in some 
countries reached an annual rate of 
1,000%. Tales abound of the 
Argentine or Brazilian housewife 
who, one m orning in the 1980s, 
decided to bake a cake. According 
to these stories, she went to the store 
to purchase eggs for the batter, got 
home, and decided she needed 
more eggs. She then returned to 
the store with the am ount of money 
paid for the eggs 20 minutes earlier, 
only to find they had doubled in 
price. Such tales are legion and leg­
endary.
In 1996, Brazil’s inflation fell to a 
56-year low. The reason for this 
drop was no mystery. Sao Paulo’s 
Fundagao Institucional de Pesquisa 
Economica, an economic research 
institute, said in a report, “Inflation 
slowed because Brazil’s m ore open 
economy led to increased competi­
tion in prices.” Maintaining the pre­
sent economic policy, the institute 
added confidently, “will keep infla­
tion low.”
The problem is that while inflation 
now appears to be under control, 
unemployment has soared to 
unprecedented levels in several 
countries in the region. Argentina’s 
unemployment rate stands at 
between 17% and 18%, while 
Colombia’s rate of 13% is the high­
est in a decade. Latin America’s 
infamous income gap has also wors­
ened. Brazil still tops the World 
Bank’s list of countries whose 
income distribution paradigm is an 
inverted pyramid—representing 
enormous incomes for those at the 
top with but a small slice left for the 
masses at the bottom—but a recent 
addition to this list is Chile, ostensi­
bly the economic model for an 
entire continent.
A survey in Chile showed that well 
over half the population rejected the 
economic model implemented by 
General Augusto Pinochet and main­
tained by his democratically elected 
successors. In light of other data 
showing that most Latin American 
countries have not reduced poverty, 
raised education levels, or improved 
workers’ buying power, even those 
international financial institutions 
that advocate austerity programs and 
economic openness have sounded 
the alarm.
In 1996, the World Bank admitted 
that its free market policies had 
failed to improve the living condi­
tions of the world’s poorest 20%.
The institution called on Latin 
American nations to increase spend­
ing on such social services as health 
and education. Similarly, the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB) 
warned this year of the conse­
quences of “reform fatigue,” result­
ing from m ounting frustration over 
fruitless promises.
Yet despite protests and other 
signs of exasperation, the catcalls in 
Buenos Aires ring slightly hollow. 
Bucaram was forced out of office 
under rather unusual circumstances, 
and no other government in the 
region has felt threatened enough 
by protests and widespread public
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Despite its flaws, neoliberalism is here to stay
A slum clings to a hillside in Ecuador. The economic gains of neoliberal policies often do not trickle down to those who need them most. 
In Latin America, the 7iumber of people living at the poverty level has reached 210 million.
discontent to change its economic 
policies. Nor does any Latin 
American country appear to be on 
the verge of social explosion. 
Venezuela may have come close, but 
despite 70% disapproval ratings for 
President Rafael Caldera’s govern­
m ent and crippling strikes by various 
service sectors, a countrywide break­
down seems unlikely.
Statistics and other evidence of 
failed policies seem to shout out at 
us every day. The World Bank 
reports that the num ber of people 
living at the poverty level in Latin 
America has reached 210 million, of 
whom 58 million are children under
the age of 15. In Argentina, 600,000 
citizens have joined the ranks of the 
newly poor, and even in Chile, which 
has reduced extreme poverty over 
the last six years, one in four inhabi­
tants lives below the national poverty 
line.
Why then has the widespread con­
dem nation of Latin America’s eco­
nomic reforms—by religious leaders, 
unions, teachers, academics and 
workers, through press conferences, 
studies, summits and demonstra­
tions—not .progressed beyond the 
protest stage to become a nascent 
political movement? The answers 
vary from one country to the next,
but together the factors upholding 
reform significantly outweigh any 
disenchantment.
First, those who lost under neolib­
eral reforms were already disenfran­
chised. The unskilled, the poor and 
those with little or no education 
have minimal influence over policy. 
In highly technical, decentralized 
and globalized societies, such groups 
are likely to be further marginalized, 
with less of an organized voice.
Second, there are more voices 
today, due to the spread of democra­
cy throughout the hemisphere. 
Ironically, this characteristic of 
democratic societies has weakened
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the forces of criticism in Latin 
America. The proliferation of politi­
cal parties, think tanks, nongovern­
mental organizations (NGOs), 
hum an and civil rights groups, con­
sumer organizations and environ­
mentalists has splintered the opposi­
tion into many different factions.
The result is a widening arc with 
varying degrees of support for, or 
criticism of, the neoliberal model, 
making the possibility of a collective 
uprising against the status quo less 
likely.
A particularly eloquent example 
from Brazil provides one explana­
tion for the lack of organized protest 
against neoliberalism. Market 
research shows that compact disc 
sales in Brazil doubled between April
1996 and March 1997, suggesting 
that Latin Americans are too busy 
shopping to worry about bringing 
down the prevalent economic sys­
tem. And if they’re not buying— 
which many are not—they’re win­
dow-shopping, intoxicated by the 
availability of a wider and more 
affordable range of consumer prod­
ucts.
Like people everywhere in this 
increasingly globalized world, Latin 
Americans are becoming more indi­
vidualist and consumer-oriented. In 
Brazil alone, household ownership 
of color television sets jum ped from 
55% in 1991 to 90% last year. VCR 
ownership rose from 31% to 58%, 
while ownership of a refrigerator- 
freezer increased from 28% to 54%. 
During the same period, the num ber 
of Brazilians holding credit cards 
rose from 18% to 32%. As more peo­
ple become mass consumers, their 
interest in variety and lower prices 
grows—sometimes at the expense of 
somebody else’s job. The closing of 
local, formerly state-owned indus­
tries is considered the price paid for 
consumer demands. In this new 
consumer context, shoppers tend to 
equate state-owned monopolies with 
poor quality, waste and corruption. 
This negative opinion contrasts with
the good quality, efficiency and value 
associated with privately-owned, and 
in many cases, foreign companies.
This doesn’t mean that Latin 
Americans are uniformly elated with 
their new, expanding role as con­
sumers. Surveys show that people in 
many countries in the region are 
working longer hours, or additional 
jobs, to purchase consumer goods 
that their families now consider 
necessities. In countries like Chile 
and Argentina, it is not uncommon 
for a professional with a full-time job 
to drive a taxi after hours to make 
ends meet.
Then there is the problem of a 
viable alternative for those who see 
the neoliberal model as only exacer­
bating Latin America’s woes. Despite 
its criticism of market-oriented 
reforms, for example, Argentina’s 
Alianza was quick to clarify after its 
election victory that it would not 
push for any radical detour from 
M enem’s economic model. And in a 
recent interview, a Chilean econo­
mist asked for an alternative to the 
neoliberal policies he and his col­
leagues oppose replied, “O ur drama 
is that we d on’t have an alternative 
to propose.”
Not all critics of neoliberalism 
would agree, or be so forthcoming. 
Last year, Mexican political scientist 
Jorge Castaneda invited a group of 
respected Latin Americans to 
Mexico to formulate a coherent, 
workable alternative to neoliberal­
ism. In a subsequent article, 
Castaneda claimed that the founda­
tion for such an alternative had been 
laid. He neglected to explain, how­
ever, exactly what the plan entailed.
Some observers argue that any 
alternative plan should recognize 
that hyperinflation is no longer a 
real threat for the region, and that 
low levels of inflation are accept­
able—indeed, necessary—for achiev­
ing the kind of growth rates needed 
to tackle poverty. One Brazilian crit­
ic has suggested that voters put local 
government in the hands of more
left-leaning or socially-minded gov­
ernors who may act as a counter­
weight to the neoliberals at the 
national level. Neoliberal macro­
economics are unlikely to change 
soon, he says, but local governments 
can buck or soften the national 
model, like the Communist Party 
did in Italy.
What is the likely future of neolib­
eralism in Latin America? The 
shouting won’t go away, but neither 
will the reforms. There may be 
some braking or detouring along 
the way; for example, Mexico stalled 
its privatization process when it 
became clear it was hurting the rul­
ing party’s popularity, and in 
Argentina, the courts have hindered 
some of M enem ’s reform  efforts. 
Brazil is probably the best barom e­
ter of the direction neoliberalism is 
taking in the region, although it is 
generally behind its neighbors in 
the reform  process. No one expects 
President Cardoso to reverse his 
governm ent’s present course, 
despite the tem porary setback pro­
vided by the recent market crisis.
Another trend that will continue 
within the economic reform  process 
is the extension of trade accords 
and the creation of what could con­
ceivably become a hemispheric 
trade zone—minus the United 
States. While the US has pretty 
m uch wasted the past three years 
when it comes to launching trade 
initiatives with Latin America—we 
all rem em ber that Clinton invited 
Chile to join Nafta back in 1995— 
Latin American countries, from 
Mexico to Argentina, have not been 
idle. They now have more than a 
dozen trade agreements among 
themselves and the num ber keeps 
growing. As form er Bolivian 
President Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada said in Atlanta earlier this 
year, “We think we’ll have by the 
year 2000 at least...a trading bloc 
comprising all of South America.”
T hat’s hardly the voice of a region 
pulling back from neoliberalism. ■
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Seeking “A New Pat h”
Andres Oppenheimer
W ill the defeat of President C linton’s “fast track” authority to sign new free trade agree­ments generate a backlash in Latin 
America? Will the increasingly pow­
erful center-left coalitions in Mexico 
and Argentina shift away from a US- 
proposed hemispheric free trade 
bloc?
The answer is yes, according to a 
docum ent prepared by potential 
presidential candidates from some 
of Latin America’s leading opposi­
tion parties. The docum ent in 
question—a 24-page manifesto enti­
tled, “After Neoliberalism: A New 
Path”—was released in Buenos Aires 
in November 1997. The alternative 
vision of development presented in 
its pages may have a significant 
impact on US exports—and jobs— 
in coming years.
The explicit critique of neoliberal­
ism was the result of four meetings 
in Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica by 
a group of centrist and leftist politi­
cians, several of whom have a good 
shot at winning their countries’ 
next presidential elections.
Members of the group, informally 
known as “the Buenos Aires 
Consensus,” included Mexican 
politicians Vicente Fox,
Cuauhtem oc Cardenas, Manuel 
Camacho and Andres Manuel 
Lopez Obrador; form er Brazilian 
president Itam ar Franco and lead­
ing opposition candidate Luiz 
Ignacio “Lula” da Silva; Argentine 
opposition leaders Graciela
Andres Oppenheimer is a columnist at 
the Miami Herald.
Excerpts from “After 
Liberalism: A  New Path”
A strong, active and financially healthy state is a necessary precon­
dition for, no t an enemy of, a democratized m arket economy. To this 
end, we should aim for increased tax collection that progressively 
reaches international levels. To reconcile increased levels of taxation 
with the need for private savings and investment, we should consider 
im plem entation of a range of options. W hen properly adm inistered, 
indirect consum ption taxes—generally in the form of a value-added 
tax—can attain this objective. The regressive slant of such taxes is 
more than com pensated for by the redistributive effects of the social 
spending that they fund. Certain types of direct taxes also play an 
im portant redistributive role: a progressive tax on personal con­
sum ption (based on the difference between a citizen’s total earnings 
and proven savings); an estate tax, with special emphasis on inheri­
tances and charitable contributions; and a tax on natural resources, 
to set aside a portion of the profits from such deposits for the nation­
al patrimony. Swift punishm ent o f tax evasion and broadening the 
base of contributors are further key elements of fiscal reform.
Latin American governments should strive to eradicate corruption, 
dishonesty and inefficiency so that every fiscal dollar yields its maxi­
mum productivity in social and hum an terms. In some countries, 
where domestic debt siphons off a large part of public finances and 
produces astronomical interest rates, the state must be restored to fis­
cal health. The m ethods for achieving this goal can include privati­
zation, as long as the profits of such sales are channeled toward reduc­
ing domestic debt and the interest paid by the government and pri­
vate entities on international loans. We reject the practice o f using 
privatization to finance the curren t account or pay off foreign debt. 
Privatization should be im plem ented on a case by case basis, not as a
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m atter of ideological dogma. New state-owned enterprises could be 
created tomorrow, while others are sold to the private sector today. 
Privatization is a useful tool for breaking up property and spurring 
competition, not simply a way for public monopolies to pass into pri­
vate ownership. Above all, policy makers must bear in m ind three 
points whose absence has already taken a toll on Latin America. First, 
countries should have long-term developm ent strategies that set 
broad param eters for growth. Privatization, as well as the conserva­
tion or creation of state-run enterprises, should fit within these para­
meters. Second, there is a vital need for institutions to oversee 
the sale of state-owned companies, ensuring the transparency and 
fiscal logic of privatization. Such institutions are necessary to avoid 
obvious abuses—such as influence trafficking, leaking privileged 
inform ation and selling below m arket value—and to make sure that 
the choice o f buyers is in the best national interest, with the funds 
for purchase deriving from legitimate activities. Third, most Latin 
American countries lack the regulatory framework to supervise pri­
vate companies that acquire a semimonopoly on public services. 
W ithout such a framework, privatization can be harm ful and coun­
terproductive. ■
Fernandez Meijide, Carlos “C hacho” 
Alvarez and Rodolfo Terragno; and 
Ricardo Lagos, Chile’s public works 
minister. Nevertheless, the docu­
m ent makes it clear that not all par­
ticipants agreed on all points. The 
final product was not signed, to 
avoid time-consuming debates over 
details, and at least one of the origi­
nal members of the group—Brazil’s 
da Silva—has already asked that his 
name be removed.
Despite these drawbacks, the 
g roup’s attack on neoliberalism rep­
resents an opposition consensus on 
major issues, including the follow­
ing points:
>■ “To set in m otion mechanisms 
for regulating speculative foreign 
investment.” The group suggests 
following the example of Chile and 
Malaysia by limiting massive 
overnight withdrawals from local 
stock markets, in an effort to pre­
vent the sudden waves of capital 
flight that periodically cripple Latin 
American economies.
>- “More integration am ong our­
selves, and less with others.” The 
group hopes to strengthen and 
expand Mercosur, the South 
American free trade agreem ent that 
includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. The logic behind this 
argum ent is that Latin America 
should become a strong free trade 
bloc in its own right before engag­
ing in trade negotiations with the 
United States.
>- “The taxation rate should rise 
progressively to international lev­
els.” Wealthy Latin Americans pay 
significantly less taxes than their 
counterparts in the United States or 
Europe. The docum ent proposes 
new value-added taxes, as well as 
more stringent taxation of charita­
ble contributions and inheritances.
>- “Privatization should be imple­
m ented on a case by case basis, not
as a m atter of ideological dogm a.” 
The docum ent argues that the pur­
pose of privatization is to fragment 
ownership and encourage competi­
tion, no t simply to transform key 
industries from state monopolies 
into private monopolies.
>- “We must open up the com m uni­
cations media, which in most Latin 
American countries have passed 
from state control into the hands of 
private monopolies.” The concen­
tration of radio and television 
licenses should be limited, as it is in 
the United States, to prevent news 
m onopolies in specific markets.
Jorge Castaneda, the Mexican 
political scientist and New York 
University professor who organized 
the meetings along with Brazilian-
born Harvard Law School professor 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, insists 
that the Buenos Aires Consensus 
will not undo the economic reforms 
undertaken by most Latin American 
countries.
“What has been done is a given,” 
Castaneda says. “T here’s no going 
back on it. This is a new set of pro­
posals that has nothing to do with 
the im port substitution or big gov­
ernm ent schemes of the past.”
Will the Buenos Aires Consensus 
stand the scrutiny of economists? 
One thing at least is clear. In light 
of recent events—the victory of cen­
ter-left coalitions in Mexico and 
Argentina, the setback to Clinton's 
“fast track” proposal and the col­
lapse of Latin American stock mar­
kets—the g roup’s proposals will be 
taken more seriously than ever. ■
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Mexico’s Nine-Fingered President
George W. Grayson
n Mexico City, storytellers like 
to regale visitors with tales of 
Mexican heroes’ missing 
appendages. Some insist that 
nineteenth-century dictator 
Antonio Lopez Santa Ana 
buried a lost leg amid pomp and cir­
cumstance. Others recall the ampu­
tated arm of revolutionary paladin 
General Alvaro Obregon, who wore 
his empty sleeve as a badge of valor 
when successfully running for presi­
dent in 1924 and 1928.
Since the July 6, 1997 setback suf­
fered by the ruling Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in key mid­
term elections, local raconteurs have 
added the nation’s “nine-fingered” 
president to the list. Ernesto Zedillo, 
figuratively speaking, has lopped off 
his index finger: at least with respect 
to handpicking some major office­
holders in the time-honored practice 
known as the dedaw (after the 
Spanish word for finger, dedo).
In an act of political self-mutilation, 
Zedillo divested selection of Mexico 
City’s mayor from the presidency, 
proposing an off-year ballot that 
nonetheless drew an overwhelming 
75% turnout. And once the electoral 
results flashed across TV screens, 
Mexico’s 47-year-old jefe took placato­
ry actions never before witnessed 
within his party which, since assum­
ing power in 1929, has treated politi­
cal foes with all the tenderness of 
Cromwell ruling Ireland. Zedillo not 
only congratulated Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas—the winning candidate
George W. Grayson teaches governmen t 
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His eighth book on Mexico, “Mexico: 
Corporatism to Pluralism?” was pub­
lished by Harcourt-Brace in late 1997.
from the leftist-nationalist 
Democratic Revolutionary Party 
(PRD)—but also invited the mayor- 
elect to meet personally in the presi­
dential palace. After the requisite 
socializing and photo opportunity, 
Zedillo promised to endorse 
Cardenas’ candidates for the capital’s 
police chief and attorney general, 
despite the fact that naming these 
officials is a prerogative that has rest­
ed with the chief executive for most 
of this century.
Such “cavorting with the enemy,” 
in the words of one critic, appeals to 
the PRI's contingent of machine- 
politics “dinosaurs” as much as would 
gargling glass shards. Led by tough- 
as-nails governors Manuel Bartlett 
Diaz (Puebla), Roberto Madrazo 
Pintado (Tabasco), Victor Cevera 
Pacheco (Yucatan), and union hon­
cho Leonardo “La Guera” Rodriguez 
Alcaine, these hardliners see in the 
mid-summer election the imperative 
for confronting, not appeasing, their 
adversaries.
Why did the PRD sweep Mexico 
City by a two-to-one margin? Who 
bears responsibility for the loss of two 
additional governorships, raising to 
six (of 31) the num ber of statehouses 
held by the center-right National 
Action Party (PAN)? What account­
ed for the PRI’s squandering of its 
majority in Mexico’s 500-member 
Chamber of Deputies? These are a 
few of the compelling questions that 
the party needs to address.
Bardett and his cohorts have drawn 
up a plan of action for the PRI to 
avoid future debacles at the voting 
booth. Their priorities include: 
selecting candidates more likely to 
appeal to the electorate; running 
more skillful campaigns; giving no 
quarter to PRD and PAN “crybabies,”
quick to claim election fraud at the 
first hint of unfavorable results; play­
ing hardball with the press by with­
holding government advertising from 
publications whose reporters fail to 
write puff pieces about the PRI; and 
employing the regime’s legitimate 
resources to reward loyalists and 
mobilize voters. “After all,” observed 
one portly boss, “no one in your 
country raised a fuss when Bill 
Clinton jetted  around the US on Air 
Force One, stumping for Democratic 
candidates in 1996, just as George 
Bush had done for the Republicans 
four years earlier.”
PRI veterans buttress their argu­
ments by pointing to last July’s voting 
tallies in the states under their con­
trol. There, with the exception of 
PAN-dominated cities, the official 
party demolished its opponents— 
with few morning-after yowls of 
fraud.
Zedillo’s allies in the PRI point to 
different lessons from the mid-year 
election results and dismiss the old 
guard’s calls for cosmetic change to 
party tactics as too little, too late. As 
of early 1998, the PRI’s approval rat­
ing stood at an anemic 25%. Party 
reformers—including Senators Elba 
Esther Gordillo, de facto head of the 
prominent Teachers' Union, chief of 
the PRI’s white-collar “popular sec­
tor” and the country’s leading female 
politician; and Esteban Moctezuma 
Barragan, Zedillo’s movie-star hand­
some alter ego—contend that the 
recent reverses call for root-and- 
branch reforms. In their view, the 
PRI must abandon its status as an 
arm of the governing hierarchy, 
assuming a more critical attitude 
toward official policies. They call on 
the party to devise a more coherent, 
moderate program, attractive to the
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Can Zedillo hold the PRI together without the dedazo?
nonideological majority of Mexican 
voters. Besides banning the dedazo, 
they argue, the PRI should open all 
decisions to rank-and-file members. 
They place particular emphasis on 
courting previously ignored con­
stituencies such as women, environ­
mentalists, shantytown dwellers and, 
especially, young people—82% of 
whom voted for the opposition in the 
Mexico City mayoral elections.
This divergence of views could 
spark a brawl at the next meeting of 
the PRI’s National Political Council,
the party's central committee, tenta­
tively scheduled for mid-1998. After 
hardliners clash with reformers, the 
party headquarters on Avenida 
Insurgentes Norte may be reduced to 
rubble. Even if one side prevails, the 
PRI itself will have lost the struggle, 
making its chance of holding onto 
the presidency in 2000 about as likely 
as Mexico’s changing its national 
anthem to the “Star-Spangled 
Banner.”
In its favor, the PRI boasts astute 
coalition-builders such as new
Government Secretary Francisco 
Labastida Ochoa and Senators 
Gordillo and Moctezuma—potential 
worthy successors to Zedillo, who is 
limited to a single, six-year term 
under the country’s constitution. 
Continued economic expansion in 
1998 and 1999 would make this list of 
hopefuls look even better vis-a-vis the 
alternatives in the PAN and PRD.
Despite his best efforts to undergo 
a political facelift, Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas won the capital elections 
more as a result of street-level ani­
mosity toward the PRI than pro-PRD 
sentiment. Indeed, the PRD more 
closely resembles a Mideast bazaar 
than an organized party, as disaffect­
ed priistas, social democrats, 
Trotskyites and hard-core Stalinists 
vie for influence within its ranks. 
Before campaign advisors convinced 
him to smile occasionally and preach 
the virtues of free enterprise and 
moderation during the July elections, 
the Yankee-bashing Cardenas railed 
against Nafta, lauded protectionism 
and touted the virtues of big govern­
ment. A lackluster governor of 
Michoacan state in the early 1980s, 
Cardenas must now show his mettle 
in administering a city—called 
“ungovernable” by some urban 
experts—beset by crime, pollution, 
gridlock and unemployment if he 
hopes to be a credible presidential 
contender.
The more conventional PAN aug­
ments its commitment to capitalism 
with social Christian precepts. After 
the party’s candidate for mayor of 
Mexico City finished last among the 
major contenders, a new cadre of 
politicians with strong ties to business 
sought greater influence within the 
PAN. The favorite of these so-called 
“northern barbarians” for the presi-
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dency in 2000 is successful 
Guanajuato governor and ex-Coca 
Cola executive Vicente Fox Quesada, 
a blue jean  clad, shoot-from-the-hip 
populist who tailors his message to 
suit his audience. Much to his dis­
may, Fox—already at odds with ortho­
dox panistas—may have to compete 
with popular Chihuahua Governor 
Francisco Barrios, another northern 
barbarian.
Fortunately for the PRI, its national 
conclave does not have to end like a 
Greek tragedy. Although personal 
and ideological differences will per­
vade the meeting, key decision mak­
ers in the 69-year-old party share an 
emphatically pragmatic outlook. 
There is widespread consensus that 
the divided forces within the PRI 
must forge a rapprochement, lest 
m odern Mexico’s dominant political 
force find itself relegated to has-been 
status after the 2000 elections.
In fact, Zedillo—once prepared to 
take a “hands-off’ approach—now 
realizes that the next national con­
tests are too im portant for him to 
remain on the sidelines. Soon after 
his inauguration in December 1994, 
the new chief executive found him­
self overwhelmed by a currency 
devaluation and subsequent deep 
recession. The brainy, Yale-trained 
economist threw himself into obtain­
ing external loans, cutting the federal 
budget, raising selected taxes and 
pushing ahead with the local version 
of perestroika. His herculean efforts 
bore fruit last year as the economy, 
which nose-dived 6.9% in 1995, grew 
7% amid tumbling prices and sub­
stantial job creation. Nevertheless, 
these gains came too late to stave off 
the PRI’s losses at the polls.
While tackling the economic crisis, 
the technocratic Zedillo—with scant 
experience in politics before reach­
ing the presidential palace—delegat­
ed the political heavy lifting to then- 
Government Secretary Emilio 
Chuayffet Chemor. This veteran 
wheeler-dealer, nam ed in the State of 
Mexico’s Machiavellian political
machine, became virtual prime min­
ister. Even as Zedillo and his eco­
nomic team racked up one success 
after another, Chuayffet—an old- 
school manipulator uncomfortable 
with Mexico’s recent political open­
ing—botched one assignment after 
another. His Keystone Kops tactics 
led to a bungled attempt to grab con­
trol of the Chamber of Deputies after 
the July 1997 elections, and he 
showed little imagination in resolving 
the festering conflict in Chiapas, 
where he refused to recognize self- 
governing Indian enclaves in return 
for Zapatista concessions.
Chuayffet’s inability to bring clo­
sure to the Chiapas problem cost 
Zedillo dearly when masked gun­
men—allegedly linked to the PRI— 
slaughtered 45 Tzotzil Indians on 
December 22, 1997. This massacre 
prom pted the president to sack 
Chuayffet and appoint Labastida 
Ochoa, a 55-year-old career politician 
with experience as a governor, diplo­
mat and cabinet member. Until 
becoming government secretary, 
Labastida ran the Ministry of 
Agriculture, where he observed first­
hand the grinding misery that afflicts 
most chiapanecos and, indeed, half of 
Mexico’s 97 million inhabitants. His 
appointment demonsnates Zedillo’s 
increasing confidence in his own 
political judgm ent. Making peace in 
Chiapas will not only boost 
Labastida's political star, but will 
enable the president to complement 
economic opening with more ambi­
tious political liberalization.
Which priorities have the best 
chance of bringing the PRI’s clashing 
factions closer together? At the top 
of the list are creating jobs, improv­
ing education, broadening health 
care and combatting crime in cities 
and rural areas. Just as important is 
reinvigorating the Solidarity 
Program, a grassroots, antipoverty ini­
tiative launched by Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari, Zedillo’s once-lionized, now- 
vilified predecessor. His recent tribu­
lations aside, Salinas understood that
political stability implied a genuine 
social stake for Mexico’s lower classes, 
even as irreversible changes buffeted 
the economy. Nevertheless, the PRI 
would have to reinvent the Solidarity 
Program under a new name; in the 
present climate, as political scientist 
Oscar Aguilar Asencio has pointed 
out, any venture associated with the 
ex-president is automatically branded 
with a “political swastika.”
Mexico’s leadership might also 
consider modifying Nafta to post­
pone elimination of tariffs on corn 
and other grains. Otherwise, most 
communal farms, or ejidos—especially 
in the poverty-stricken, violence- 
prone states of Chiapas, Guerrero 
and Oaxaca—will be unable to com­
pete with the US agribusiness giants 
poised to achieve full entry into the 
Mexican market early in the next 
century. By then, the largely 
unskilled campesino population will 
have grown to 30 or 40 million peo­
ple. Those unable to land jobs in the 
countryside will overflow into 
Mexican cities, cross the Rio Grande, 
aggravate the drug crisis in the 
United States or join the guerrilla 
movements active in Mexico’s south­
ern states.
On the whole, three factors bode 
well for the PRI's survival, although 
predictions for the year 2000 are still 
premature. First, just as a rising tide 
lifts all boats, economic gains should 
enhance the PRI’s standing with vot­
ers, although turmoil in Asian mar­
kets accompanied by the fall in oil 
prices has forced the president to 
trim his ambitious 1998 budget. 
Second, Zedillo may have found in 
Labastida the man who can bridge 
the gap between the party’s warring 
camps. And finally, although still 
spurning use of the dedazo, Mexico’s 
increasingly popular chief executive 
can promote party unity by vetoing 
the nomination of Bartlett, Madrazo 
or other reform-averse bitter-enders 
whose selection would ensure the 
PRI’s political dismemberment at the 
hands of the electorate. ■
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M odule I — U pdating and In tegrating  the 
Fundamentals: Strengthening Core Functional 
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• have a minimum of five (5) years of 
managerial experience;
• hold responsibility for activities that are 
impacted by international competitive forces;
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Reports: Jamaica
Patrolling the Polls
Gary Brana-Shute
A pair of soldiers beefs up security at the Tel Aviv polling station in Kingston. Photo: 
Gary Brana-Shute.
S
ince Jamaica’s democratic 
system took root in 1944 
with universal adult suf­
frage, national politics 
have been characterized by 
a regular pendulum swing 
of two terms each for the island’s 
main political forces, the People’s 
National Party (PNP) and the 
Jamaican Labour Party (JLP). This 
trend has been accompanied by a ris­
ing spiral of political violence, with 
1976, 1980 and 1993 remembered as 
particularly bloody years.
The country’s most recent elec­
tions, on December 18, 1997, 
brought new hope of breaking this 
cycle. Incumbent Prime Minister P.J. 
Patterson led the PNP to a historic 
third victory over the JLP and its 
leader, Edward Seaga. In the final 
tally, the PNP won 50 of the 60 parlia­
mentary seats at stake and 56% of the 
popular vote. The JLP acquired 10 
seats with about 40% of the vote, and 
the National Democratic Movement 
(NDM), a JLP splinter group led by 
Bruce Golding, won 5% of the vote 
but no seats. Total voter turnout was 
about 65%, although it varied by con­
stituency; in some rural areas, the fig­
ure averaged less than 50%.
Perhaps more important than the 
election results, however, were the 
relative Uansparency of the political 
process and the low level of political 
violence that accompanied it. In 
1993, nearly one-third of constituen­
cies were decided by less than 500
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votes, creating a situation in which 
violence and intimidation became 
key determinants of voting behavior. 
Observers feared a repeat of this per­
formance in 1997, but both local par­
ticipants and international onlookers 
were relieved to report elections that 
were peaceful, orderly and open.
T h e  P repa ra tio n s
As Election Day approached in late 
1997, the m ood on the sneets and 
the tone of the political debate indi­
cated a change from the political 
gridlock and violence that usually 
precede elections in Jamaica. Politics 
here are dominated by garrison con­
stituencies, essentially armed camps 
that pledge their loyalty to political 
parties in exchange for all m anner of 
patronage. These bastions of one- 
party rule are potential powder kegs 
for political violence. This time, how­
ever, polidcal tribalism and garrison 
warfare were denounced in the 
media and on street corners.
Control over key parliamentary seats, 
long dominated by a particular party, 
suddenly seemed less certain. 
Jamaicans seemed to be exercising 
more choice in their political 
options, with traditional dependency 
on leadership giving way to a new 
sense of “followership” that called 
into question traditional party alle­
giances.
Local and international observer 
groups made an effort to ensure the 
transparency of the electoral process. 
Civic Action for Free and Fair 
Elections, a local NGO, offered to 
m onitor polling stations, hoping to 
deter through its presence the most 
blatant instances of ballot stuffing, 
theft and turf wars between rival 
gangs. The Electoral Office also 
invited the Carter Center to observe 
the elections, the first time an inter­
national organization was asked to 
play such a role in Jamaica. This ini­
tiative was welcomed by the JLP and 
NDM but opposed by the PNP until
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An armed personnel carrier guards the Denham Town polling station, Kingston. 
Photo: Gary Brana-Shute.
Robert Pastor, the director of the 
Carter Center, persuaded the leaders 
of the three parties to agree to a 
truce during the elections. Ultimate­
ly, Pastor’s was the only voice believed 
when national radio confirmed that 
the margin of error on the voter rolls 
was negligible and that the elections 
could proceed. His 60-member 
observation team was joined for sev­
eral days by President and Mrs.
Carter, General Colin Powell and 
world heavyweight boxing champion 
Evander Holyfield.
The Jamaican government itself 
instituted various electoral reforms, 
including a mechanism for halting 
procedures and reballoting if mal­
practice was reported at any polling 
station. These reforms were backed 
by the presence of Jamaica’s security 
forces. Every one of the country’s 
6,332 polling stations had armed 
police on duty; in Kingston, police 
with body armor and automatic 
weapons were joined by soldiers who
secured defensive perimeters around 
the stations. Snipers took up posi­
tions on rooftops, and columns of 
armored personnel carriers rumbled 
along major thoroughfares. Soldiers 
patrolled Kingston’s labyrinth of gul­
lies, and fleets of motorcycle police 
were on call if necessary. Helicopters 
crisscrossed overhead. If the posses 
and political gangs were armed, the 
security forces had upped the ante.
Despite these preparations, howev­
er, Prime Minister Patterson was criti­
cized for calling elections without 
allowing for adequate time to pre­
pare an updated voter registration list 
and the sophisticated voter identifica­
tion technology to guard against 
fraud.
El e c t io n  D ay
On Election Day itself, the garrison 
communities were sealed off. In the 
capital, West Kingston and Seaga’s 
fabled strongholds of Tivoli Gardens 
and Denham Town turned out on
cue; one polling station reported 178 
votes for the JLP against only one for 
the PNP. South St. Andrew—a dis­
trict that includes Jones Town,
Trench Town and Rema, the sites of 
much bloodshed in the past—gave its 
votes to PNP finance minister Omar 
Davies. Central Kingston and the 
boroughs of Alman Town and Tel 
Aviv went to new PNPer Ronnie 
Thwaites, a middle-aged activist 
lawyer from the 1970s. In Rae Town, 
bordering Central and East Kingston, 
gangs of JLP young men chanted, 
“Showa, Showa” (for Shower, the 
name of the posse associated with the 
JLP and which, through its “dons” or 
“rankin’s,” runs the neighborhood 
and its “foreign relations”) . Faces 
painted green, they invaded a Tel 
Aviv polling station that was fortified 
like Fort Apache, only to find them­
selves outgunned by Jamaican army 
troops. Fortunately for all involved, 
the army, usually all too ready to use 
force, did not fire a single shot all 
day. What gunfire there was came 
from lone shooters and political sabo­
teurs, who raked polling stations with 
bullets or opened up on passing cars 
rum ored to hold politicians from 
other parties.
Suburban and rural areas tended 
to lean toward their traditional pref­
erences. Labor Minister Portia 
Simpson, known as the gunwoman of 
the PNP and head of a large garrison 
in Southwest St. Andrew, won handily 
in the area known as “Miss Portia’s 
constituency.” There were some 
exceptions, however; in suburban 
North St. Andrew, JLP newcomer 
Delroy Chuck won a surprise victory 
over the PNP incumbent. Another 
unexpected result was Bruce 
Golding’s loss to the formidable 
Olivia “Babsy” Grange in the rough
Hemisphere • Volume Eight, Number Two
Reports: Jamaica
BREAKING THE CYCLE
The PNP’s victory in the December 1997 elections marked the first time in 
Jamaica’s democratic history that one party remained in power for more 
than two terms. Dates in bold represent JLP victories; regular typeface indicates a 
PNP victory.
1944, 1949, 1955, 1959, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1976,1980, 1983, 1989, 1993, 1997
city of Spanish Town. Miss Babsy 
wanted that seat back for the JLP, but 
her victory came only after tense vot­
ing during which a female poll moni­
tor was fatally stabbed.
This m urder was the only one 
directly connected to political vio­
lence during the elections. Three 
other homicides occurred technically 
before and after the polls were open, 
and have been traced to drug deals 
or personal animosities. The final 
tally for Election Day thus included 
four deaths; two stolen ballot boxes, 
one of which was retrieved; shots 
fired; and intimidation of candidates 
and their supporters. One case 
involved the kidnapping of a PNP 
polling supervisor by an angry mob 
in the JLP snonghold of Rae Town. 
He described his experience as 
“being held captive behind enemy 
lines.”
In Barbados, where elections dis­
play the rectitude of a Swiss canton, 
this sort of behavior would be 
grounds for national outrage. By 
Jamaican standards, however, it was 
an encouraging performance. The 
low level of violence did not go unap­
preciated by the rank-and-file; in a 
run-down, filthy elementary school in 
Trench Town, an old woman shoved 
her folded ballot through the slot of 
a grey metal box and, oblivious to the 
20 heavily-armed men who surround­
ed her, raised her arms and cried, 
“Oh, thank you Jesus, ‘dis too sweet— 
las’ time we dead like dog.”
There were reports of voter fraud, 
but by all accounts it was not suffi­
cient to affect the outcome of the 
elections. In Angola, a JLP outpost 
in East Kingston, observers encoun­
tered several polling stations where 
presiding officers had boldly opened 
ballot boxes and were busy stuffing 
them with extra ballots. The officers 
reported 156 votes for the JLP and 
one for the PNP, but there were only 
136 ticks on the tally sheet. To make 
up for this discrepancy, they filled out 
20 more ballots themselves. Since 
police officers were not allowed to
enter polling stations, they were pre­
sumably ignorant of such violations.
C o n t in u in g  P r o blem s
Political violence is the foremost 
obstacle facing the democratic 
process in Jamaica. This problem 
has intensified as the garrisons aug­
m ent their traditional activities with 
drug trafficking, gunrunning, docu­
m ent forgery, smuggling of aliens 
and links to criminal gangs abroad, 
primarily in the United States. 
Children as young as nine or ten, 
known as “fryers” (small chickens), 
carry out arm ed missions for the 
garrison commanders. Sadly, this 
culture of violence has become 
deeply rooted in the fabric of 
Jamaican life and will not easily yield 
to attacks by reform-minded politi­
cians.
The 1997 electoral process was 
also m arred by administrative bun­
gles. Polling station officers failed to 
show up; voting materials, such as 
ballots and ID cards, were not deliv­
ered on time; people who insisted 
they had registered did not appear 
on the voting lists and were turned 
away; and there was confusion over 
where to vote. Because Patterson 
called the elections without much 
advance notice, the Electoral Office 
was unable to produce all of its voter 
cards on time and had to hastily 
update the old voter registration list. 
To add to this chaos, voters and can­
didates were subject to intimidation 
in the form of roadblocks, jeering 
and harassment, gunfire, and gang 
members who prohibited voters 
from crossing their tu rf to reach 
polling stations.
The elections could not have been 
carried out as smoothly as they were 
without the help of the Jamaican 
security forces, which helped protect 
voters from intimidation, posses, pri­
vateers and freelance crooks. The 
performance of the army and police, 
as well as the equipment at their dis­
posal, was vastly superior to that of 
the 1980s and warrants continued 
upgrading and assistance.
Despite the relatively peaceful out­
come of the last elections, however, 
the underlying structures and voting 
patterns of Jamaican politics remain 
unchanged. The JLP shrank back to 
its original garrison base and sup­
porters among the merchant elite, 
while the PNP, appealing to Jamaican 
nationalism, surged ahead with the 
support of marginal voters. And yet, 
some familiar faces seemed destined 
for retirement, allowing new leaders 
to take their places. With the PNP’s 
victory, Edward Seaga seems finished, 
while Bruce Golding suffered a 
humiliating setback. Patterson him­
self appears to have reached the apex 
of his career, and rumors are already 
circulating that Health Minister Peter 
Phillips is his likely successor.
Jamaica’s biggest problem is its 
economy, which has not improved 
substantially over the past decade no 
matter which party was in office. The 
new government must restore growth 
and deal with Jamaica’s myriad social 
problems, including violence and 
drugs. And while the 1997 elections 
were a positive omen for the future 
of the country’s political system, 
Jamaica’s leaders must institutionalize 
electoral reforms that will ensure fur­
ther peaceful transitions. ■
16 Hemisphere  • Volume Eight, Number Two
I f  you do business or have interests in Latin America, you should be reading
The key journal for professional investors, commercial bankers, corporate executives, 
investment bankers and government officials throughout Latin America.
Every month LatinFinance brings you:
•  H ard-hitting analysis of m a jo rtren ds  and techniques in Latin Am erican finance and investm ent
•  Profiles of the region's best corporations, and in terv iew s w ith  top management and analysts
•  Analysis of the strategies and ta c tics  of the institutions and individuals th a t move the markets
•  Rankings and surveys of outstanding deals, analysts, bankers and corporations
your paid subscription to LatinFinance you w ill also receive:
Government Relations
LatinFinance's government relations supplements examine prevailing economic and political conditions in the region's major countries and 
states. Topics addressed include trade liberalization, privatization and public sector reform, capital markets development, foreign investment, 
pension fund reform, major economic sectors and infrastructure development. Coming up: Brazil
Latin Banking
The Latin Banking Guide &  Directory includes information on over 700 banks in 18 countries in Latin America, w ith  statistics on assets, loans, 
deposits, equity, income and expenses, and profits, as w e ll as key ratios detailing capital adequacy, asset quality, pro fitab ility and efficiency. 
Tables list Latin bank stocks and bonds, and a directory includes banks and banking executives throughout the region.
Private Banking &  M oney M anagem ent
A unique reference guide to the leading private bankers and money managers serving Latin American and international clientele, w ith  articles 
focusing on key topics in the industry. A country-by-country directory highlights the leading institutions providing services and products to  the 
region.
Corporate Finance Handbook
The Latin Corporate Finance Handbook is a comprehensive overview of annual corporate finance activity in the region. Detailed listings include 
bonds, equity issues, syndicated loans, and mergers and acquisitions by the region's corporations, and league tables h ighlight the top 
underwriters and advisers.
Corporate Travel Guide
An indispensable city guide featuring 35 business centers in Latin America and essential information for business travellers—transportation 
and communications, currency exchange, hotels, airlines, car rental agencies and travel taxes. Reader surveys highlight the region's best 
hotels, a irlines and rental car agencies.
Trade Finance
LatinFinance's annual guide and directory to trade finance in Latin America covers recent trends and developments in trade finance, structured 
trade finance, forfa iting and trade automation as w e ll as a comprehensive country-by-county directory to the leading institutions actively 
involved in this market.
SPECIAL OFFER FOR STUDENTS
□  YES! I would like to order a subscription to LatinFinance magazine,
at the Special Student Rate* of only $145 in the US and $175.00 outside the US
□  Regular Annual Rate: $ 195.00 in the US and $225.00 outside of the US
Signature (required)_________________________________________  D a te _____________
N am e____________________________________________________________________________________________
Address___________________________________________________________________________________________
C ity _____________________________________________________S ta te __________________ Z ip ______________
Telephone_______________________________Fax_______________________________________E -m ail________
'C o p y  of student ID required
P lease charge my □  Am ex □  V isa/M c #_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Exp. _
□  P lease find enclosed a check in U SS payable to LatinFinance
LatinFinance, 2121 Ponce de Leon Blvd., Suite 1020, Coral Gables, FL 33134 Tel: (305) 448-6593, Fax: (305) 448-0718
F E A T  
Frontiers of Development
Allan Rosenbaum
P
erhaps the most interest­
ing aspect of any discus­
sion regarding the role 
of local government in 
prom oting economic 
development in Latin 
America is simply the fact that it is 
occurring. Such a discussion would 
have been virtually unheard  of little 
more than a decade ago, when 
issues related to economic develop­
m ent were dealt with almost exclu­
sively at the national level.
Concerns such as local job creation 
took a back seat to controlling infla­
tion and other macroeconomic 
objectives; even the largest munici­
palities lacked the resources and the 
infrastructure to play a significant 
role in economic development.
Obviously, m uch has changed in 
Latin America over the past decade. 
W hereas 15 years ago most local 
officials were appointed by the cen­
tral government, today almost all 
mayors and municipal council 
members are chosen by popular 
election. Municipal officials are 
now closely involved in redefining 
local policy agendas, thus helping 
to change the nature of political 
accountability and responsiveness 
in the region. This transform ation 
has contributed to the dispersion of 
political power th roughout the 
region and is central to the dem oc­
ratization process occurring all 
across Latin America.
Perhaps equally im portant, how­
ever, the process of decentralization
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is also changing patterns of service 
delivery throughout the hem i­
sphere. The reason for this is sim­
ple: As the role of municipal gov­
ernm ents increases, local officials 
recognize the connection between 
effective services and the likelihood 
of success in the next election. The 
em ergence of local governm ent as 
a significant presence in an increas­
ingly democratic Latin America has 
created a healthy com petition 
between national and subnational 
governments. At the local level, 
this trend has helped create close 
linkages between economic devel­
opm ent, job  creation and the rise 
of strong and effective municipal 
governments.
L o c a l  G o v e r n a n c e  a n d  E c o n o m ic  
D e v e lo p m e n t  
This relationship is very im por­
tant, because there is a clear corre­
lation between the strength of local 
governm ent and the relative level 
o f a country’s economic develop­
m ent, as evidenced by the differing 
proportion of governmental expen­
diture and employment found at 
the subnational level. In N orth 
America and Europe, an average of 
50% of all governmental expendi­
ture and 57% of all governmental 
em ployment occurs at the subna­
tional level. By comparison, in 
Asia—the scene of rapid economic 
developm ent over the past 
decade—the figures for expendi­
ture and em ploym ent are 30% and 
37%, respectively, while in Africa— 
the least economically developed 
region of the world—rates are as 
low as 10% and 6%. Latin America 
falls somewhere in between the two, 
with 19% of governmental expendi­
ture and 21% of governmental
employment at the subnational 
level.
The reasons for the correlation 
between economic development 
and governmental activity at the 
subnational level are obvious. 
Economic developm ent does not 
spring magically from the environ­
m ent. It depends on such factors as 
local initiative, adaptability and 
capacity; basic infrastructure to 
facilitate business, commercial or 
industrial activity; a supportive legal 
framework; and the ability to mobi­
lize necessary resources and 
respond rapidly to an ever-changing 
environm ent. These requirem ents 
are most easily met when local 
authorities have the capability to 
cooperate with entrepreneurs—be 
they local or national—to initiate 
new economic development.
A perfect example of these trends 
is a part of the U nited States famil­
iar to many Latin Americans: the 
state of Florida. During the past 
decade, the Disney W orld/O rlando 
entertainm ent complex and the 
M iam i/D ade air- and seaport have 
em erged as two of the most signifi­
cant forces for economic develop­
m ent in the state. The Disney/ 
O rlando area now possesses more 
hotel rooms than any other m etro­
politan area in the country, while 
commercial activity at Miami’s air- 
and seaport has tu rned  a once- 
sleepy tourist town into a major 
center of international trade, bank­
ing and tourism.
Were it no t for the highly decen­
tralized nature of governm ent in 
the US, these remarkable engines 
of local economic developm ent 
would no t exist at all. U nder a cen­
tralized system, political forces from 
California (then a m uch larger and
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m ore powerful state than Florida) 
would have undoubtedly blocked 
the creation o f the extensive infra­
structure necessary to establish the 
Disney World complex. Likewise, 
states such as New York and 
M aryland (both sites o f m ajor 
ports) could have discouraged 
investm ent in the construction of 
p o rt facilities in the M iam i/D ade 
County area. These projects were 
m ade possible by the fact that local 
governm ents in the US enjoy sig­
nificant autonomy, including the 
capacity to raise revenue and the 
authority  to modify the legal 
framework to facilitate econom ic 
developm ent activities.
S t r a t e g i e s  f o r  L o c a l  J o b  
G e n e r a t io n  a n d  E c o n o m ic  
D e v e lo p m e n t  
As local officials in Latin 
Am erica becom e concerned  about 
issues of jo b  developm ent, their 
initial approach resem bles that of 
their N orth Am erican counterparts 
th ree or four decades ago. Their 
first efforts tend  to focus on luring 
m ajor corporations, factories and 
com m ercial enterprises to their 
com m unities. This strategy has 
always been politically attractive, 
since large facilities are likely to 
generate favorable m edia atten­
tion; however, the num ber of large 
corporations available for recru it­
m ent is lim ited at any po in t in 
time and cannot be relied on to 
m eet the em ploym ent and devel­
opm ent needs o f most local com­
munities. T here has been an 
increasing realization, in both 
N orth and South America, of the 
need  to adopt new approaches to 
jo b  creation. Consequently, local 
officials are paying m ore attention
to small businesses and their 
potential to generate local employ­
m ent. Such enterprises have 
played an im portan t role in job  
creation during the past two 
decades.
Studies show that 50-80% of all 
new jobs in the US are created by 
com panies with less than 100 
employees. Additional research 
suggests that com panies with 
u n d er 20 employees produce as 
many as two-thirds o f all new jobs. 
Similar patterns of developm ent 
are beginning to be recognized in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 
popular relocation sites for large- 
scale production plants from o ther 
regions. In one study, the Inter- 
Am erican Developm ent Bank 
(IDB) found that small and  m edi­
um-sized com panies account for 
one-third of the reg ion ’s jobs and
GDP. Such com panies, however, 
are responsible for the creation of 
at least 50% of all new jobs in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.
In light of these statistics, it is 
clear that m unicipalities that focus 
their efforts on luring large busi­
nesses can m eet only a part of 
their econom ic developm ent and 
em ploym ent needs. Ultimately, 
large com panies do no t generate 
as many new jobs as do small busi­
nesses. Furtherm ore, the ability to 
play one potential location off 
against ano ther allows big com pa­
nies to secure tax breaks and subsi­
dies that may u ndercu t the bene­
fits of relocation for the com m uni­
ties involved.
T here are a num ber of im por­
tant activities that local govern­
m ents—independently  or in con­
junction  with national or regional
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In an example of local initiative, the Municipality of Asuncion is involved in a joint 
venture with the private sector to redevelop the city’s waterfront.
governm ents—can initiate to 
encourage and support small busi­
ness enterprises. Probably the sin­
gle most im portan t step is improv­
ing access to the credit that small 
businesses need  to start up and 
expand their operations. In the 
US, this concern  has led to the cre­
ation of various kinds of govern­
m ent credit assistance program s at 
both  the state and local level, espe­
cially in larger cities like Chicago
and Miami. Such program s have 
been successful in many com m uni­
ties.
Credit is an even greater con­
cern for small businesses in Latin 
America than it is in the US, due 
to the traditional restrictiveness of 
Latin Am erican banking and credit 
practices. Since the mid-1980s, the 
IDB has created various financial 
institutions to make loans available 
to small and medium-sized busi­
nesses in the region. O ne example 
is the Inter-American Investm ent 
C orporation, which has m ade over 
1,000 loans since 1989. The IDB 
has also encouraged individual 
countries to establish financial 
institutions responsive to the needs 
of small en trepreneurs. Perhaps 
the most successful experience in 
this regard is Banco Sol in Bolivia. 
C reated as a nonprofit organiza­
tion in 1985 (and originally known 
as the Fund for Prom otion and 
Developm ent of M icro-Enterprise), 
Banco Sol was chartered  as a com­
mercial bank in 1992 with a mis­
sion to lend to small businesses. 
This strategy has proven to be both 
profitable and productive; since 
going com mercial, Banco Sol has 
m ade over 71,000 individual loans, 
averaging $660 each. Over 70% of 
its custom ers are women. W ithout 
question, w hether working inde­
pendently  or in conjunction with 
private or nonprofit organizations, 
Latin A m erica’s larger and m id­
sized cities should make a greater 
effort to make credit available to 
support the growth of small busi­
nesses.
A nother crucial area of support 
is providing small businesses with 
technical assistance, especially with 
regard to such activities as p roper 
accounting procedures, m arketing 
and m arket research, and product 
distribution techniques. A success­
ful exam ple o f such efforts is the 
small business incubator program  
in Porto Alegre, Brazil, which 
exists through a public-private 
partnership.
Local governm ents can u n d er­
take a variety o f o ther activities to 
encourage the developm ent of 
small businesses and, consequently, 
em ploym ent opportunities within 
their com m unities. In La Paz, 
Bolivia, fo rm er Mayor Ronald 
McLean worked to reduce cum ber­
some m unicipal regulations and 
fees, thereby creating a tax and 
regulatory environm ent favorable
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to small business development. 
A nother im portant and increasingly 
com m on strategy involves the cre­
ation of new municipal structures 
to facilitate long-term economic 
development. Such efforts, which 
are already underway in Cali, 
Colombia and several Uruguayan 
cities, can help identify particular 
m arket niches and potential areas 
for future development. Still 
another useful strategy involves ori­
enting local purchasing practices 
toward local vendors and produc­
ers.
Increasingly, Latin American 
municipalities are turning to strate­
gic public-private partnerships as 
vehicles for local economic devel­
opm ent and job  creation. In 
Asuncion, Paraguay, Mayor M artin 
Burt has launched an initiative to 
use local community centers for job  
training activities in cooperation 
with the National University of 
Asuncion. A nother Burt effort— 
first initiated by his predecessor, 
Carlos Filizzola, and encouraged by 
a US Agency for International 
Development local governance pro­
jec t—involves a jo in t venture 
between the Municipality of 
Asuncion and the private sector to 
redevelop the city’s waterfront.
This project will add 1,700 acres of 
w aterfront land and generate a 
wide variety of new tourist and com­
mercial activities.
C o n c l u s io n
Issues of local governance are 
becom ing a growing concern in 
Latin America as recognition 
spreads of their im portance to 
democracy and development. 
Increasingly, however, this new fron­
tier of democracy is also becoming 
a frontier of effective public service. 
Motivated by the realities of grow­
ing electoral accountability, ener­
getic and com m itted local officials 
are taking on new and m ore signifi­
cant responsibilities. Increasingly, 
their efforts have concentrated on
economic developm ent and job  
generation.
Like their N orth American coun­
terparts several decades ago, Latin 
America’s municipal officials are 
realizing that successful economic 
developm ent and job  creation ini­
tiatives can have positive political 
consequences. As a result, the 
hem isphere’s more creative and 
politically astute local officials view 
economic developm ent and jo b  cre­
ation as im portant elem ents on the 
m unicipal agenda. With the assis­
tance of the international aid com­
munity, they have worked to make
credit available to small en trepre­
neurs. O ther efforts involve public- 
private collaboration, an area with 
great potential for future growth.
The prom otion of job  creation 
through economic developm ent is a 
new field for Latin American gov­
ernm ent, at all levels. As such, it 
represents an opportunity for local 
officials to undertake new initiatives 
without having to com pete with the 
national government. It also gives 
local governments a chance to 
dem onstrate the relevance and 
im portance of the institutions 
under their control. ■
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Cleaning Up Free Trade
Janet Jarman
I
n 1993, opponents of the pro­
posed North American Free 
Trade Agreement (Nafta) felt 
certain that its implementa­
tion would increase pollution 
and further degrade environ­
mental conditions along the Mexico- 
United States border. Already, 
decades of economic integration 
had caused rapid industrial and sub­
sequent population growth. Form er 
agricultural towns were transformed 
into industrial centers too quickly 
for local governments to accommo­
date growth with adequate infra­
structure.
In addition, the num ber of 
maquiladoras, or export plants, in 
Mexico increased from 12 in 1965 to 
over 2,000 in 1993, contributing to 
serious air and water pollution on 
both sides of the border. During the 
Nafta debate, estimates for cleaning 
up the region ranged from the $6 
billion predicted by the Clinton 
administration to a $20 billion esti­
mate by the Sierra Club.
To combat these criticisms and get 
Nafta passed, Congress created an 
environmental side agreem ent 
designed to provide mechanisms for 
resolving disputes over potential 
transnational environmental prob­
lems. Lawmakers also incorporated 
a third, parallel agreem ent with spe­
cial reference to the border region. 
This agreem ent called for the estab­
lishment of two binational institu-
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tions, the Border Environment 
Cooperation Commission (BECC) 
and the N orth American 
Development Bank (NADBank). 
These institutions were designed to 
facilitate and fund border cleanup 
and infrastructure projects, acting as 
a type of “social contract” to coun­
teract the possible negative effects of 
free trade. Their potential to do so 
has been an ongoing debate 
between pro- and anti-Nafta groups 
in the United States. Both organiza­
tions have been subject to sustained 
criticism since their inceptions, espe­
cially from NGOs, but also from 
local Mexican officials and residents. 
Should they fail, free trade advocates 
in Congress could feel more confi­
dent of excluding environmental 
clauses from future agreements.
F o r m u l a  h a s  Flaws
BECC works with various levels of 
government, local communities and 
NGOs on both sides of the border, 
assisting them  in developing envi­
ronm ental improvement projects. 
NADBank provides financial pack­
ages for these projects. Although 
this formula seems straightforward, 
both institutions have been less effi­
cient than predicted, albeit some­
times for reasons out of their con­
trol. Most grievances fit into three 
categories: affordability, speed/effi­
ciency and public involvement.
For instance, critics argue that the 
low-income communities most in 
need of basic environmental services 
cannot afford loans under 
NADBank’s conditions. Also costly 
and time-consuming are the rigor­
ous engineering studies required by 
the BECC application—a two-stage, 
arduous process. According to 
Mexican residents and officials, it
takes less time to obtain infrastruc­
ture through existing methods— 
either by waiting for government 
grants to trickle down to municipali­
ties or through a much more rapid 
system based on political patronage.
L o n g -T erm  S o l u t io n s  N eed ed
Strapped by debts incurred in the 
1980s and exacerbated in the 1990s, 
the Mexican government lacks funds 
to support the country’s endless 
num ber of backlogged infrastruc­
ture projects. Despite President 
Zedillo’s election promises to decen­
tralize government, giving more 
power to municipalities, mayors lack 
the resources to accommodate 
growth. As a result, officials are 
forced to implement short-term 
solutions to long-term problems.
BECC and NADBank aim to 
change this system. Their overarch­
ing goal is to supplant existing 
mechanisms for obtaining infrastruc­
ture by encouraging border resi­
dents and officials to adopt a long­
term  approach to environmental 
management. Their primary finan­
cial goal is to help border communi­
ties achieve a gradual transition 
from a limited num ber of subsidized 
ventures to projects financed by bor­
rowing—either from banks or from 
the capital markets. Their primary 
social objective is to prom ote public 
participation, transparency and 
broader community involvement in 
decision making.
T a le  o f  O n e  C ity
One revealing example of 
BECC/NADBank programs in prac­
tice is the industrial border city of 
Matamoros. Located just below 
Brownsville, Texas, Matamoros hous­
es three times the residents and
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Collecting water from a public tap in the colonia ofNueva Era, in the border city of Nuevo Laredo. Residents complain that water 
there is of poor quality and supplies are erratic. Service was particularly poor during a severe regional drought during the summer of
1996. Photo: Janet Jarman.
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Trash pickers converge on a load of garbage deposited in the Matamoros municipal dump. Thirty to fifty families work in the dump 
on a regidar basis, creating an informal market for metal, tin, glass and other recyclable items. The dump is especially grueling dur­
ing the summer and when large fires set to burn the garbage create noxious fumes. Other hazards include sharp objects, disease vec­
tors and high levels of dust. Photo: Janet Jarman.
W h y  N o t  M o r e  C o r p o r a t e  
R e s p o n s ib il it y ?
Ultimately, Sampayo wonders why 
BECC and NADBank were created 
when the logical responsibility for 
border cleanup should lie with the 
Mexican and foreign industries that 
operate in the area. Fifteen of the 
city’s 100 maquiladoras are Fortune 
500 companies, but they do little to 
enhance infrastructure. Instead, 
they enjoy their tax-free status and 
contribute minimally to Matamoros 
charities. At the very least, environ­
mentalists and fair trade advocates 
argue, companies should pay work­
ers enough to afford basic services 
that would reduce environmental 
hazards in their immediate sur­
roundings.
In one of the most controversial 
BECC/NADBank projects to date, 
FINSA, a private industrial park, 
requested a loan to upgrade one of 
its water treatm ent plants to meet 
Mexican environmental standards. 
By charter, NADBank is perm itted to 
provide assistance to private entities. 
Yet, upon certification of the FINSA 
project, even the bank’s main spon­
sor in the US Congress, Esteban 
Torres, said that FINSA represented 
the “wrong type” of private project. 
In his words, “the FINSA project 
provided a clear example of the pri­
vate sector taking advantage of pub­
lic funds to enhance their own oper­
ations.” O ther allegations by envi­
ronm ental and policy groups in 
Texas stated that FINSA and BECC
never adequately engaged the public 
before certifying the project.
The FINSA controversy brought 
about two fundam ental changes in 
BECC policy. The first sought to 
ensure community participation by 
obligating BECC to publish a list of 
all projects under consideration at 
least 45 days prior to upcoming pub­
lic meetings. A second and less 
straigh tforward ruling required all 
“private only” projects to provide 
some type of “community benefit.” 
FINSA’s response to this require­
m ent was a reluctant agreem ent 
to contribute $50,000 (5% of 
NADBank’s loan guarantee) of “in- 
kind” engineering services for infra­
structure studies in neighboring 
colonias. FINSA made this promise
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in January 1996, but as of August
1997 colonia residents had seen no 
concrete studies.
At the time, FINSA representative 
Fernando Paulin Delgado gave sev­
eral explanations for the park’s fail­
ure to meet its community obliga­
tions. Among them, he cited “obsta­
cles and red tape” created by BECC 
and NADBank. “We want to finish 
the study, but the NADBank refuses 
to give us our loan,” he said. “How 
can we help the community if the 
NADBank doesn’t give us our loan?”
Technically, though, NADBank 
never promised FINSA a loan—only 
a loan “guarantee” equal to half the 
am ount of the $1 million needed to 
build the treatm ent plant. FINSA 
utilized a short-term loan from 
another Texas bank to pay for the 
plant, constructed by Mexican engi­
neering firm BIMEXSA. FINSA 
may someday need NADBank’s guar­
antee to repay this loan; until then, 
however, the bank cannot force 
FINSA to fulfill its promise to the 
community. “When the borrower is 
ready to borrow, we’ll give them the 
loan,” explained the bank’s general 
manager, Victor Miramontes. “But if 
the deal never closes, we have no 
obligations.”
According to a NADBank 
spokesperson, FINSA and BIMEXSA 
recently approached the bank about 
the loan. The guarantee is held up 
in the bank's internal approval 
process while officials do due dili­
gence on the borrowers. It is still 
unclear whether NADBank will ever 
issue the guarantee.
Many colonia residents feel disillu­
sioned and betrayed. “We thought 
we deserved the studies from FINSA, 
but they broke their promise,” said 
one colonia president, Margarita 
Murillo. W ithout FINSA’s support, 
Murillo must return to traditional 
methods of obtaining infrastructure 
in her community—through local 
and state government bureaucracy 
and infinite trips to City Hall. She 
and other colonia residents gave up
on the BECC/NADBank process 
long ago. For them, the institutions 
seemed like distant entities far 
removed from the everyday realities 
of low-income border communities.
T h e  P r ic e  o f  M o d e r n iz a t io n
The experiences of officials and 
residents of Matamoros illustrate 
some inherent contradictions and 
potential pitfalls of the BECC/ 
NADBank process. Since its incep­
tion, BECC has reviewed over 100 
project outlines and certified 19. 
NADBank has approved financing 
packages for four projects, but has 
actually financed only two. This 
is due in part to the fact that 
NADBank was never intended to be 
a primary lender. Its first objective 
is to solicit and coordinate funding 
from other sources. Should the 
bank choose to be a lender itself, it 
can provide only 50% of the value of 
any project. As a result, many pro­
jects become stalled as sponsors seek 
the remaining 50% financing or as 
communities negotiate rate-fee 
structures designed to cover debt 
servicing.
BECC and NADBank officials 
defend the organizations’ track 
record. “What they [critics] don 't 
want to admit,” says BECC general 
m anager Javier Cabrera, “is that this 
is the price of democracy ... It 
requires a lot more effort and m en­
tal investment since you have to sell 
ideas, discuss them, and have argu­
ments to convince people at all dif­
ferent levels.” He adds that in the 
past, many Mexican communities 
depended on subsidies. “This is the 
traditional way,” he says, “but now 
we have opened up our economy, 
and we have to modernize. One of 
the ways to do this is to recuperate 
costs, and Mexicans are not used to 
this.”
This is not to say that BECC and 
NADBank officials d on’t understand 
the controversial nature of imposing 
fees for the first time or of raising 
existing rates for new projects. Both
institutions have established innova­
tive technical assistance programs 
aimed at helping cities achieve 
smooth transitions to the new 
model. In particular, BECC has suc­
ceeded in prom oting a more trans­
parent and participatory approach 
to decision making in Mexico. 
According to Domingo Gonzales, an 
outspoken Mexican environmental­
ist, BECC has opened the process of 
what he calls “Mexican wheeler- 
dealerism” to public scrutiny.
Nevertheless, Gonzales and other 
skeptics doubt that the institutions 
can transform the border region. 
After observing the Mexican system 
for years, Gonzales believes that the 
NADBank’s assumption that envi­
ronm ental infrastructure in Mexico 
can be decided upon and financed 
the way it is in the United States 
shows a poor understanding of the 
nature of Mexican government. In 
his opinion, Mexico’s centralized 
power structure almost guarantees 
the failure of the application 
process.
Furtherm ore, neither BECC nor 
NADBank has enforcement powers 
aside from public pressure. 
According to Congressman Torres, 
this is because they are not part of 
Nafta’s core. “Future environmental 
clauses must be integrated into the 
main body of the agreem ent,” he 
argues. “W ithout these powers, no 
agreem ent can effectively address 
environmental or labor conse­
quences of free trade.”
On a more discouraging note, it is 
unlikely that BECC or NADBank will 
influence the inclusion of environ­
mental clauses in future free trade 
agreements. The US Congress 
recently rejected President C linton’s 
efforts to gain “fast-track” authority 
over such agreements, due in part to 
the ongoing debate over controver­
sial issues such as labor and the envi­
ronm ent. These issues will likely 
come back to haunt the negotiation 
process for a hemispheric Free 
Trade Area of the Americas. ■
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The Left as Arbiter
Osman Morales Roca
O
n August 6, 1997, for­
mer military dictator 
General Hugo Banzer 
Suarez became 
Bolivia’s fifth constitu­
tional president since 
the country returned to democratic 
rule in 1982. With a plurality of only 
21%, Banzer’s rightist political party, 
Accion Democratica Nacionalista 
(ADN), was forced into an unlikely 
coalition with populist parties such as 
Unidad Civica Solidaridad (UCS) 
and Conciencia de Patria (Condepa), 
as well as Bolivia’s main leftist party, 
the Movimiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionaria (MIR). These dis­
parate allies pledged to maintain the 
neoliberal model innoduced by 
President Victor Paz Estenssoro 
(1985-1989) and expanded on by his 
successors: Jaime Paz Zamora (1989- 
1993) and Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada (1993-1997).
Banzer and his coalition partners 
make for strange bedfellows, but they 
seem poised to continue a trend that 
has characterized neoliberalism and 
its implementation in Bolivia. In this 
highly politicized country with a 
strong revolutionary heritage, leftist 
and populist parties have emerged as 
a force in reshaping neoliberal 
reform. Given their importance in 
coalition-building, these parties have 
used political leverage to gain conces­
sions and patronage posts from the 
government. Their advocacy of a 
com ponent of social justice on the 
neoliberal agenda, combined with
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protests by labor unions, peasants, 
teachers and students, has played a 
role in determining the course of 
reform in Bolivia. However, this 
influence has not extended to any 
real modification of the reform 
process in such key areas as privatiza­
tion and decentralization of 
resources.
T h e  O r ig in s  o f  R efo r m
In the decades following the 
Bolivian National Revolution of 1952, 
Bolivia—like most of Latin 
America—followed a statist model of 
development. After the debt crisis of 
the early 1980s, however, govern­
ments throughout the region recog­
nized the need for drastic economic 
measures. When Paz Estenssoro took 
office in 1985, he embarked on a 
major overhaul of economic strategy. 
His main goals were to stabilize the 
exchange rate, liberalize trade and 
capital accounts, reduce the public 
deficit, halt hyperinflation and 
improve the country’s relationship 
with international credit organiza­
tions. By the end of his term  in 
1989, most of these goals had been 
met, and in the last decade Bolivia 
has enjoyed economic stability, low 
inflation rates and manageable bud­
get deficits and debt services.
In light of this success, successive 
presidents retained most features of 
Paz Estenssoro’s economic plan. 
However, implementation of these 
policies met with many hurdles, both 
internal and external. With its small 
private sector, scarce domestic savings 
and low levels of foreign investment, 
Bolivia relies on massive external 
financing from sources such as the 
IMF and World Bank. Such depen­
dency is the Achilles’ heel of the 
Bolivian economy, since foreign
lenders, especially the United States, 
impose many conditions in return 
for aid. Well into his first year in 
office, Sanchez de Lozada declared, 
“The IMF comes, the World Bank 
comes, the US ambassador comes, all 
to tell us what to do.”
Bolivia also faces internal chal­
lenges to neoliberalism: most impor­
tant, an extremely politicized civil 
society. Labor, political parties and 
regional civic committees are outspo­
ken critics of government policy, 
which they claim has only deepened 
existing inequalities in Bolivian soci­
ety. Neglecting the social aspects of 
neoliberalism could thus pose a seri­
ous threat to macroeconomic stability 
and democracy in Bolivia.
T h e  B o liv ia n  M o d e l : C apitalization  
a n d  P o p u l a r  Pa r tic ipa tio n
Given Bolivia’s internal socioeco­
nomic and political context, pure 
neoliberalism is not a feasible option 
for governments hoping to stay in 
power. Sanchez de Lozada gave the 
policy a new twist, combining statist 
structures with newer economic mod­
els. In an astute balancing act, he 
applied market-based policies (espe­
cially privatization and macroeco­
nomic management) to appease the 
nation’s external creditors, while 
maintaining statist structures to satis­
fy internal demands for social justice. 
He structured his reform program 
around two basic elements designed 
to m eet this double goal: capitaliza­
tion, a variant of privatization intend­
ed to achieve sustained economic 
growth by attracting foreign invest­
m ent and private sector involvement; 
and popular participation, an 
attempt to democratize the political 
system by redistributing political 
power and economic resources to
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Implementing neoliberal reform in Bolivia
Bolivia’s capitalization program originally included a $250 annual pension for the 
country’s senior citizens. General Hugo Banzer’s government eliminated this program, 
known as the Bonosol. Photo: Felipe Sanguines.
states and municipalities. While 
these measures were designed to fur­
ther the neoliberal model, they also 
contained structuralist elements that 
kept the state involved in key areas of 
the economy, politics and society.
Bolivia is perhaps the most anti­
neoliberal country in the hemi­
sphere. All sectors of civil society and 
the political elite have, at least since 
1952, been nurtured by the state
through public employment and 
political patronage, and are under­
standably loath to relinquish their 
privileges. Sanchez de Lozada’s first 
task was to design a model of privati­
zation that would be palatable to 
these entrenched interests. Under his 
plan, management control and 50% 
of key state enterprises—telecommu­
nications, electricity, airlines, rail­
roads, oil and gas, and the tin and
antimony smelter and refining com­
plex (ENAF)—were transferred to 
private foreign capital. The other 
50% of shares remained in Bolivian 
hands, in the form of a privately 
managed pension fund that distrib­
uted about $250 annually to the 
country’s senior citizens. The first 
distribution was carried out in May 
1997; foreign investors did not pay 
the Bolivian government for their 
50% shares, but instead invested the 
value in increasing the companies’ 
capital.
Popular participation was another 
aspect of Sanchez de Lozada’s 
attempt to implement a form of 
neoliberalism acceptable to his social 
critics. This program increased local 
autonomy by redistributing 20% of 
central funds to Bolivia’s municipali­
ties, provinces and departments, 
according to their population. It 
reversed the traditional flow of 
resources from the provinces to the 
center and effected a redistribution 
of functions, making local govern­
ments responsible for social services 
such as health care, education and 
housing. This new autonomy was 
especially important for indigenous 
communities and the poorest regions 
of the country, and ensured that 
funds were handled in a more trans­
parent fashion. Decentralization 
thus enhanced political participation 
and democracy while legitimizing a 
system condemned for producing 
inequality.
In t e r n a l  a n d  Ex ter n a l  C o n s t r a in t s
Considering the strength of anti­
neoliberal sentiment in Bolivia, the 
slow pace of reform should come as 
no surprise. Sanchez de Lozada had 
to balance external and internal 
demands in order to maintain his
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Riding the neoliberal train: Bolivia’s state-owned railroad company, ENFE, was capitalized in 1995 after bitter labor and bidding 
disputes. Photo: Felipe Sanguines.
administration’s credibility both at 
home and abroad. By paying atten­
tion to social concerns, he attempted 
to humanize the neoliberal model.
At the same time, he carefully man­
aged macroeconomic indicators and 
privatized major state enterprises.
All of Sanchez de Lozada’s reforms 
m et with serious opposition in the 
form of protests by peasants, workers, 
students and teachers. Nationalists 
opposed the capitalization of strate­
gic state enterprises such as the state 
airline, Lloyd Aereo Boliviano; the 
petroleum company, Yacimientos 
Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos 
(YPFB); and the state-owned railroad. 
In light of the century-plus dispute
between Bolivia and Chile concern­
ing access to the Pacific coast, these 
critics were particularly incensed 
when the railroads were sold to 
Chilean private enterprises.
Labor unions denounced capital­
ization, calling it a scheme for ceding 
key state enterprises to foreign 
investors, and state employees feared 
the policy would result in layoffs. 
Miners, historically an important 
political force in Bolivia, protested 
the privatization of state-owned min­
eral deposits, while teachers and uni­
versity students opposed educational 
reform. At the same time, civic com­
mittees urged greater regional auton­
omy than that granted by popular
participation, pressing for direct elec­
tion of departmental authorities. 
Some departments, such as Tarija 
and Santa Cruz, went so far as threat­
ening to secede.
Despite such opposition, Sanchez 
de Lozada managed to achieve major 
progress in his reform agenda. By 
mid-1997, five of the six major state 
enterprises, as well as 49 smaller 
ones, had successfully been capital­
ized, bringing in roughly $1.8 billion. 
Some enterprises, such as the state 
telephone company (Entel), attract­
ed more revenue than anticipated. 
Layoffs were mostly averted, and the 
government granted certain opposi­
tion demands, such as allowing
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Entel’s employees to buy shares in 
the company. In a major coup, 
Sanchez de Lozada also attracted for­
eign investment for YPFB exploration 
and development projects. With the 
aid of more than $2 billion from 
multilateral institutions, the company 
has started construction of a 3,000 
kilometer natural gas pipeline to 
Brazil.
And yet, while Bolivia’s reform pro­
gram has resulted in some notable 
successes, less promising economic 
indicators persist. Since 1987, the 
ratio of investment to GDP has hov­
ered between 5% and 6%, low even 
by Latin American standards. The 
country’s reliance on mining 
(accounting for almost half of 
exports) and natural gas leaves the 
economy dependent on primary 
products, which are vulnerable to 
swings in international market prices. 
High unemployment, unequal 
income distribution and outright 
poverty remain im portant problems 
for Bolivia, whose per capita annual 
income of $650 is the lowest in South 
America. The United Nations’ 
Hum an Development Index—a rat­
ing that combines indicators of real 
purchasing power, education and 
health—consistently ranks the coun­
try towards the bottom of the list for 
Latin America. Bolivia also depends 
on US approval to continue borrow­
ing from multilateral institutions, 
which account for most of the coun­
try’s foreign debt.
Politically, the coast is also far from 
clear. If they persist, protests against 
the reform packages could further 
destabilize Bolivia’s notoriously 
volatile political system. Despite suc­
cessful negotiations and concessions 
made by both the government and 
protesters, political instability looms 
large. Unless the reforms yield 
immediate positive results, the 
nation’s political system may once 
again become chaotic.
On a more positive note, Bolivia’s 
democratic system is stronger now 
and has changed the way that struc­
tural reforms are debated and car­
ried into law. When Paz Estenssoro 
introduced neoliberalism, he did it 
by authoritarian means. Under 
Sanchez de Lozada, however, struc­
tural reforms were subject to a demo­
cratic process that both slowed and 
legitimated their execution. Every 
item was challenged, debated and 
negotiated, enabling the president to 
gain crucial support from parties that 
could normally be expected to 
oppose neoliberalism. Sanchez de 
Lozada sought alliances with Victor 
Hugo Cardenas, leader of the indige­
nous Movimiento Revolucionario 
Tupac Katari de Liberacion 
(MRTKL)—and subsequently his vice 
president—as well as with the pop­
ulist UCS and the leftist Movimiento 
Bolivia Libre (MBL). These organi­
zations, traditionally unreceptive to 
market reforms, supported the gov­
ernm ent while voicing some of the 
demands of the electorate.
C o n c l u s io n
The state still plays a major role 
in the Bolivian economy; it is respon­
sible for macroeconomic manage­
m ent and infrastructure, and 60% of 
all investment is concentrated in the 
public sector. Likewise, a large part 
of the Bolivian labor force relies on 
public employment. The most bla­
tant aspects of statism, such as high 
tariffs and nationalization, may be 
gone, but more subtle ones remain 
and may influence the future course 
of neoliberalism in Bolivia. Tradi­
tional structures and institutions, 
such as dependence on the state by 
various sectors of civil society— 
including labor for subsidies and wel­
fare, business for protections and 
incentives, and political elites for 
patronage—will not vanish immedi­
ately, regardless of external pressures 
for market-oriented reforms.
Just as state regulation interferes 
with the market, so does market logic 
interfere with political and, especial­
ly, social goals. Sanchez de Lozada 
did not blindly pursue neoliberal
reforms. Faced with opposition from 
labor and peasant organizations, as 
well as other political parties, he 
modified his agenda to devote more 
resources to social programs. Left-of- 
center parties (UCS, Condepa, MBL 
and MIR) played an im portant role 
in calling attention to the social costs 
of neoliberalism, while facilitating 
the consensus necessary for econom­
ic, political and social stability.
Popular leftist groups, given access 
to power, have managed to block the 
most extreme manifestations of 
neoliberalism. In the 1997 presiden­
tial elections, Sanchez de Lozada 
and his coalition government were 
perceived as too neoliberal and were 
voted out of office. Although Banzer 
and the ADN won the elections, the 
UCS and Condepa were close 
behind. As a result, the continued 
role of populists and leftists as coali­
tion partners in neoliberal govern­
ments promises to maintain the deli­
cate balance between neoliberalism 
and statism. Banzer has called for 
continued implementation of 
Sanchez de Lozada’s reform agenda, 
although there are indications that 
the economy is faltering. In 
December 1997, in response to bud­
get shortfalls, the new government 
launched a so-called gasolinazo that 
raised fuel prices by 30%. It also 
announced elimination of the 
Bonosol, the annual payment of $250 
to all Bolivians over 65 instituted by 
Sanchez de Lozada’s administration. 
Labor unrest predictably followed, 
but the ruling coalition stood stead­
fastly behind these unpopular mea­
sures.
On the whole, the need for eco­
nomic growth seems to have modi­
fied Bolivia’s left-of-center parties, 
who seem to be leaning toward the 
attitude expressed by Luis Maira of 
Chile’s Socialist Party: “We must 
build a house with two stories. The 
second story should involve social 
programs, but the ground floor must 
include sound macroeconomic prin­
ciples.” ■
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Democratic Constraints to Reform
Jorge Vargas-Cullell
osta Rica has little to 
show for its experience 
with privatization.
Even after three struc­
tural adjustm ent loans 
from the World Bank 
in a little over a decade— 1985,
1989 and 1993— the Costa Rican 
governm ent has im plem ented a 
slow, shallow, piecemeal privatiza­
tion. Most privatized institutions 
once belonged to the Costa Rican 
Development Corporation 
(Codesa), a public holding that 
em bodied the country’s brief expe­
rience with entrepreneurial state 
strategy. A strong interventionist 
state remains a m ajor actor in key 
markets such as finance, power, 
telecommunications, insurance and 
social security. As Sebastian 
Edwards argues in his work Crisis 
and Reform in Latin America, in 
term s of privatization, Costa Rica 
lags far behind  the rest of Latin 
America.
Given its relative inexperience in 
this area, Costa Rica may seem like 
a spurious example for a m odel of 
privatization. In term s of the com­
parative politics of privatization, 
however, the country emerges as an 
im portant case. Privatization in 
Costa Rica has not been a response 
to widespread, prolonged state fail­
ure. On the contrary, Costa Rica, 
the oldest stable democracy in
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Latin America, is the only country 
in Latin America where the state 
has im plem ented economic and 
institutional reform s within a 
m ature dem ocratic regime. Unlike 
similar efforts in Chile, Argentina 
or Mexico, Costa Rican market 
reform  has confronted multiple 
democratic constraints to sweeping 
policy changes. And in contrast to 
Venezuela, state interventionism  
and dem ocratic institutions have 
not led to economic and political 
quagmires. The study of privatiza­
tion in Costa Rica, therefore, sheds 
light on a basic question: How do 
democracies in developing coun­
tries cope with m ajor policy 
reforms? Addressing this concern 
affords im portant insight into the 
long-term survival of democracies 
in countries with developing, vul­
nerable economies.
Privatization in Costa Rica is also 
intriguing on its own terms.
Despite appearances to the con­
trary, “E pur s ’il muove,” as Galileo 
put it. Still it turns. In the last 
decade, the Costa Rican govern­
m ent has im plem ented privatiza­
tion in the areas of finance, power 
generation, staple foods, commerce 
and industry, with heated debate 
over reforms in the power and 
telecomm unications sectors.
Despite its modest scope, however, 
privatization has been at the core of 
Costa Rica’s political debate on 
m odernization. Following Harvey 
Feigenbaum ’s and Jeffrey H enig’s 
definition of privatization as the 
transfer of functions and activities 
from the state to the private sector, 
Galileo’s maxim applies: Things 
move, albeit slowly, in Costa Rica.
W hat then accounts for the slow 
pace of privatization in Costa Rica?
The most convincing explanation is 
that dem ocratic constraints, as well 
as linkages between the state and 
political parties, limit the govern­
m en t’s ability to im plem ent sweep­
ing institutional reforms. Since 
many actors hold veto power, the 
process of coalition-building is 
inclusive and collusive. Costa Rica 
is undergoing a process of alliance 
transform ation, allowing reform ers 
prom oting privatization to collude 
with institutional actors who hold 
veto powers. This process has 
allowed the governm ent to imple­
m ent a limited privatization pro­
gram; yet the complex nature of 
such negotiations renders sweeping 
reforms unfeasible.
T h e  C o s t a  R ic a n  Ex p e r ie n c e
Com pared to Chile, Argentina 
and Mexico, privatization in Costa 
Rica has been minimal. In the first 
three countries, governments trans­
ferred entire sectors to the private 
sphere through ambitious public 
divestiture programs. M odern­
ization of the state was at the heart 
of m arket-oriented reforms 
designed to replace state-led devel­
opm ent. In contrast, although 
Costa Rica was one of the first Latin 
American countries to receive a 
World Bank structural adjustm ent 
loan, privatization there has not 
proceeded as rapidly as elsewhere 
in the region.
In the 1980s, successive Costa 
Rican adm inistrations im plem ented 
a gradual, piecemeal process of pri­
vatization. This process has been 
characterized by extended lags 
between the decision to privatize 
and actual im plem entation. 
Moreover, privatization has been 
im plem ented on a case by case
c
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Oil is a sensitive issue for any country contemplating privatization. Costa R ica’s refineries remain under the control of the state- 
owned oil company, Recope.
basis, with divestiture, as a rule, not 
the preferred  approach. Instead, 
the governm ent has chosen gradu­
ally to lower entry barriers to m ar­
kets previously m onopolized by the 
public sector, leading private com­
panies to devise new m arket condi­
tions to com pete with existing pub­
lic firms. These trends hold true for 
three of the main areas of the Costa 
Rican economy exposed to privati­
zation: finance, power and tele­
communications.
T h e  F in a n c ia l  S e c t o r  
From 1980 to 1997, Costa Rica fol­
lowed a steady policy of market lib­
eralization. A series of laws passed 
to further this goal included provi­
sions to allow private banks access to 
state funds; the form ulation of a 
state regulatory framework over 
public and private banks; and new 
guidelines for the domestic capital 
market. Finally, in November 1995, 
Congress abolished what rem ained 
of the state monopoly over savings
and checking accounts—the linch­
pin of state-led development from 
1950 to 1980. The legislature then 
created a new legal framework for 
the financial sector, redefining the 
central bank’s functions and rein­
forcing the state’s regulatory capa­
bilities.
Costa Rica’s financial sector is 
presently undergoing an accelerated 
transition to private ownership and 
global integration. Following strong 
m arket expansion during the 1980s,
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Costa Rica is the only country in Latin America where the state 
has implemented economic and institutional reforms within a 
mature democratic regime. The study of privatization in Costa 
Rica, therefore, sheds light on a basic question: How do democ­
racies in developing countries cope with major policy reforms?
private banks took the lead in sup­
plying credit; between January and 
May 1995, they accounted for 51.9% 
of the country’s total loan portfolio.
In the 1980s, the United States 
Agency for International Develop­
m ent (USAID) actively supported 
the expansion of private banks by 
exerting pressure on Costa Rica to 
lower barriers to private competi­
tion. At the same dme, the agency 
advocated a strong financial pro­
gram to aid fledgling private banks. 
USAID funds subsidized these oper­
ations by supplying low-cost capital, 
allowing for unusually large financial 
spreads. During this period, the 
state relinquished control over the 
stock exchange, which was founded 
in 1976. New financial operators— 
including private pension adminis­
trators, leasing and factoring firms— 
also came on the scene. In 1997, 
the main private banks launched vig­
orous m erger processes and public 
banks inched toward institutional 
restructuring.
E lec tr ic it y  a n d  
T e l e c o m m u n ic a t io n s
Since its founding in 1949, Costa 
Rica’s state electricity company, the 
Instituto Costarricense de Electri- 
cidad (ICE), has retained a quasimo­
nopoly over the power generation 
sector. It has done a remarkably 
thorough job; in 1990, the num ber 
of Costa Rican homes with electricity 
exceeded 90%. Small regional utili­
ty companies—usually cooperatives 
or community-based firms—have 
continued to operate independently, 
but ICE and ICE-owned companies 
produce, transmit and distribute 
over 95% of the nation’s energy sup- 
ply.
The state began encouraging pri­
vate investment in the power sector 
in the early 1990s. New laws allowed 
private firms to generate an initial 
15% of the country’s energy supply, 
a level that soon rose to 30%. The 
same legislation required ICE to buy 
the power generated by private com­
panies, even if state reserves were 
full.
In the last five years, ICE has 
authorized the construction of over
15 power plants, with nearly 20 new 
projects pending. In the meantime, 
private investors, including the 
nation’s leading political families, 
have poured money into the power 
generation sector and form ed a rival 
company, Empresas de Cogenera- 
cion Electrica. In 1996, Congress 
began debating a bill that would 
restructure the power sector and 
create a new regulatory framework, 
opening the market to private com­
petition. However, due to a variety 
of factors—opposition from ICE 
trade unions and other civil organi­
zations, divisions within the govern­
ing Partido Liberacion Nacional 
(PLN), lackluster approval ratings 
for President Jose Maria Figueres 
and weak opposition support—the 
bill never made it to the voting 
stage.
Besides its dominance of the 
power generation sector, ICE also 
enjoys a monopoly over telecommu­
nications. Congress granted it a 
mandate to develop this sector in 
the 1960s, although private compa­
nies remained in the market until 
ICE acquired Radiografica 
Costarricense Sociedad Anonima 
(Racsa) in 1973. ICE showed signs 
of loosening its monopoly in 1988, 
when the company’s board of direc­
tors authorized Millicom, a private 
firm, to develop the cellular phone 
market through leasing. After much 
legal wrangling, however, the deal 
was nullified in 1995 by the 
Supreme Court, and ICE took back
direct operation of the market. 
Debate on a measure to restructure 
telecommunications—effectively 
ending ICE’s monopoly—has come 
to a standstill. This bill would have 
created a new regulatory framework 
and opened the market to private 
investors. The Figueres administra­
tion has ruled out state divestiture 
for this branch of ICE, although it 
has suggested selling subsidiary com­
panies (including Racsa) and leasing 
out radio frequencies.
E l im in a t in g  C o d e sa
Codesa’s privatization was the sin­
gle most im portant divestiture pro­
gram in Costa Rica. Starting in 
1985, the government sold all of the 
corporation’s subsidiaries. This was 
a comparatively easy task; given 
Codesa’s financial losses and its sub­
sidiaries’ lackluster performances, 
no political actors stepped forward 
to oppose divestiture. Over a nine- 
year period, 11 subsidiaries either 
folded or were sold. While some 
firms, such as the Central Azucarera 
del Tempisque (Catsa), were sold to 
cooperatives, others—Aluminios 
Nacionales (Alunasa) and 
Fertilizantes de Centroamerica 
(Fertica)—were sold to private 
firms. Osvaldo Duran asserts that in 
all cases the selling price was well 
below the book value set by the 
national comptroller. Finally, in
1996, Congress passed a law closing 
down Codesa.
USAID funded Codesa’s divesti­
ture programs. In 1985, the agency 
donated $160 million to a trust 
fund, naming Financiera de 
Inversiones Transitorias as fiduciary.
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This entity was responsible for 
arranging the purchase and sale to 
the private sector of Codesa’s sub­
sidiaries.
T h e  L im it s  o f  R e fo r m
Despite success stories like Codesa, 
Costa Rica’s ambitious privatization 
program faces a double bind. On 
the one hand, constraints on institu­
tional reforms rule out privatization 
a la Chile or Mexico. Costa Rica is a 
presidential democracy with a strong 
executive branch; in terms of policy 
making and patronage, the presi­
dent wields great political clout. 
Nevertheless, the regime has an 
effective system of checks and bal­
ances which limits presidential 
power. In this sense, Costa Rica fits 
Matthew Shubert’s concept of a 
“democratic regime with multiple 
vetoers.” On the o ther hand, the 
kinship between political parties and 
the state—the crux of the Costa 
Rican political system—creates high 
political and institutional stakes for 
privatization. Such relationships 
have strengthened institutionally- 
based party actors vis-a-vis non- 
institutional actors—and especially 
party organizations—to the extent 
that deep privatization could disrupt 
the party system.
The very state/party  linkages that 
slow privatization may explain how 
Costa Rica’s democracy gradually 
processes reform. These linkages 
have led to the creation of biparti­
san networks of “politico-entrepre- 
neurs,” the origins of which may be 
traced to the flourishing of the inter­
ventionist state in the 1960s and 
1970s. These ties have allowed polit­
ical parties and the entrepreneurial 
sector to develop fluid working rela­
tionships. Historically close ties 
among a diverse host of political 
actors provide a framework for 
im plementing gradual privatization 
with low levels of conflict.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, sev­
eral authors called attention to the 
phenom enon of politico-entrepre-
neurs, most of whom belonged to the 
PLN: the party that has dominated 
Costa Rican politics since 1951. This 
group of politicians turned entrepre­
neurs actively promoted Codesa’s 
expansion, sparking conflict with pri­
vate industrialists. Politicians from 
the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana 
(PUSC), a coalition of opposition 
parties formed in 1982, later joined 
these cliques. Unlike other business­
men—who typically emerge from the 
middle classes, then become politi­
cians—politico-ennepreneurs went 
the reverse route. Their power was 
rooted in the institutional structure 
of the state.
The consolidation of a bipartisan 
party system after 1982 and the 
structural adjustment process that 
followed helped forge a fluid rela­
tionship between the political and 
entrepreneurial sectors. Old antago­
nisms between the PLN and the pri­
vate sector ceased, and both parties 
included prom inent entrepreneurs 
as cabinet members during their 
times in office. These groups 
became deeply involved in policy 
making, developing close ties with 
politicians.
The financial sector is a good 
example of these linkages. Carlos 
Sojo argues that in Costa Rica, “los 
nombres de la politica no son nombres de 
empresa”; i.e., there is a clear separa­
tion between politicians and entre­
preneurs. Although this assertion 
may hold true for the banking sys­
tem, one must acknowledge that 
prom inent bankers are often politi­
cal insiders. Well-known figures in 
the world of finance such as Luis 
Lieberman (Banco Interfin), 
Bernardo Baruch (BCT), Rodolfo 
Jimenez Borbon and Jorge Sanchez 
(Banco Banex) carry their own 
political clout. In the past 20 years, 
these figures have served in key pub­
lic posts under both parties. Baruch 
served as vice minister of the trea­
sury during the Carazo administra­
tion (1978-1982); Sanchez was minis­
ter of economy and industry under
Oduber (1974-1978); Jimenez was 
President Calderon’s top adviser 
(1990-1994); and Lieberman cur­
rently serves on ICE’s board of 
directors.
In his analysis of financial liberal­
ization in the early 1980s, Bruce 
Wilson argues that in Costa Rica, the 
shift from intervention to market 
reforms “may be accounted for by 
the formation of new coalitions with­
in the government party and their 
informal coalitions with nongovern­
mental groups, both domestic and 
international.” He goes on to show 
how realignments within the PLN 
gradually gave the party the authori­
ty to launch privatizations, an ironic 
role for a political organization that 
had once championed nationaliza­
tion of the banking system. Techno­
crats and political pragmatists from 
both parties merged with a diverse 
array of social and political organiza­
tions to press for changes in the 
existing legal framework.
C o n c l u s io n
Costa Rica clearly does not fit the 
usual explanations of the politics of 
privatization. While the country has 
succeeded in opening up its econo­
my, privatization has been a sec­
ondary com ponent of market 
reforms. There is no protracted 
struggle between rival coalitions and 
opponents of privatization to 
account for such sluggish progress. 
The Costa Rican government has 
im plemented reforms within a con­
text of institutional stability, relative­
ly low levels of political content and 
increasing competition between par­
ties with similar policy platforms. A 
m ore likely explanation links the 
politics of privatization with democ­
ratic regime constraints and the his­
torical relationship between political 
parties and the state: a relationship 
characterized by collusive negotia­
tions between key political actors. 
These structural and institutional 
constraints determ ine the slow pace 
of privatization in Costa Rica. ■
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Political Costs of Privatization
Maura Alejandra Vallejo Acevedo
Mexico and Peru are examples of countries whose presidents 
have adopted neoliberalism as a way to court new allies 
through clientelism, while closing avenues of participation to 
critics of the regime. The end result has been to reinforce cen­
tralist tendencies, limiting any potential progress toward 
democratization.
A
fter the debt crisis of 
the early 1980s, Latin 
America’s leaders 
were forced to articu­
late new economic 
strategies to check 
inflation and renew the trust of 
international creditors. The last 
decade has seen an intensification 
of this process of economic readjust­
ment, which led most governments 
in the region to adopt a neoliberal 
model of economics. The neoliber­
al model is based on the idea that 
through the market there will be a 
massive reallocation of resources 
through different sectors and 
processes. The direct intervention 
of the state in the economy is the 
first logical point of discussion with­
in this context.
Analysts of Latin America have 
tended to ignore the political com­
ponent of economic readjustment. 
They expected economic reforms to 
open the political arena to new 
actors, who would in turn  create 
new channels of political participa­
tion. From the very beginning, 
however, economic m odernization 
has been a highly centralized 
process, with decision making con­
centrated in the hands of the execu­
tive branch. Mexico and Peru are 
examples of countries whose presi­
dents have adopted neoliberalism as 
a way to court new allies through 
clientelism, while closing avenues of
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participation to critics of the 
regime. The end result has been to 
reinforce centralist tendencies, lim­
iting any potential progress toward 
democratization. Reforms imple­
m ented in this way may solve fiscal 
crises in the short term, but the 
absence of a broader social consen­
sus precludes the creation of partici­
patory mechanisms that could fur­
ther the process of democratic tran­
sition.
This lack of consensus has been 
most obvious in the case of privati­
zation, one of the most im portant 
and controversial com ponents of 
neoliberal economics. Privatization 
brings fresh resources and allows 
the state to balance public finances, 
but it also leads to a redefinition of 
the very role of the state. Along 
with the economic effects of this 
redefinition, privatization strength­
ens certain political institutions— 
most notably, the executive 
branch—while socially, it eliminates 
the redistributive role of some state- 
owned enterprises. The neoliberal 
agenda has tended to ignore this 
redistributive function, leaving 
behind the discussion of the new 
political and social responsibilities 
o f the state. In this sense, the 
process of democratization has also 
been affected by the neoliberal eco­
nomic agenda.
R e f o r m in g  t h e  S tate  in  P e r u : T h e  
I n s t it u t io n a l  O u t l o o k
Peru has im plem ented one of the 
most extensive privatization pro­
grams in all of Latin America. In 
just a few years, almost all of the 
country’s state-run companies have 
passed into private hands. This 
rapid transformation is especially 
surprising given the Peruvian state’s 
past record of intervention in the 
economy. In the 1960s and ‘70s, 
state-run companies were the main 
force behind industrialization, and a 
bloated public sector was a useful 
tool for defusing social protest. In 
the 1980s, however, economic col­
lapse under President Alan Garcia 
and the outbreak of severe terrorist 
violence brought about a crisis of 
legitimacy for the state. When 
Alberto Fujimori took office in 1990 
as a political outsider, he introduced 
a severe package of economic 
reforms to rein in hyperinflation 
and restore the country’s credibility 
with international creditors. 
Privatization quickly became one of 
Fujimori's priorities. As of January
1997, he had raised over $6 billion 
through the sale of public compa­
nies to the private sector.
Given the speed of this transfor­
mation, it is easy to overlook the 
political and social costs of privatiza­
tion in Peru. The program  picked
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An Indian woman sells corn on a muddy side street in Cuzco: Fujimori’s critics complain that the proceeds of privatization have not 
addressed the root causes of poverty in Peru.
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A tentative answer to the question as to whether privatization 
furthers the process of democratic transition is: no, it does not. 
The revenues generated from privatization are a one-time 
bonus, and unfortunately are not always used to further the 
construction of democratic institutions.
up pace in 1992 after Fujimori’s 
self-styled coup, or autogolpe, which 
blam ed Congress and the judicial 
system for hindering the course of 
m odernization in Peru. A new con­
stitution passed in 1993 strength­
ened the executive branch at their 
expense, in effect making the presi­
dent the center of decision making. 
In this context, privatization 
became one of the most im portant 
aspects of Fujim ori’s agenda. In 
1991, his adm inistration established 
the Comision para la P rom otion de 
la Inversion Privada (Copri), to 
oversee the process. Copri’s board 
is composed of five ministries that 
decide which public enterprises will 
be privatized. T heir decisions are 
later ratified by the president.
Besides this formal centralization 
of powers, Fujimori also enhanced 
his position by cultivating clien- 
telist, or “neopopulist,” relation­
ships outside the traditional 
avenues of political alliance- 
building. Fujimori funneled public 
resources (including those gained 
through privatization) toward social 
spending programs valued m ore for 
their political symbolism than their 
long-term potential to reduce 
poverty. An example is the state 
antipoverty agency, the Fondo de 
Recursos para el Desarrollo 
(Foncodes). During Fujim ori’s 
reelection campaign in 1994, the 
state poured over $1 billion into 
Foncodes programs.
In general, privatization in Peru 
has been im plem ented with an eye 
toward short-term political gains. 
Fujimori has used privatization as a 
panacea to cure fiscal ills and to
coopt new bases of support. The 
problem  is that privatization does 
not represent a perm anen t source 
of income. Once the last state com­
pany is sold to the private sector 
(which Copri predicts will happen 
sometime in 1998), the well will 
ru n  dry.
The centralization of power in 
Peru raises doubts about the coun­
try’s political future. W here is the 
Peruvian state headed after 
Fujimori, given that the entire 
reform  process has centered on his 
person? And, m ore profoundly, 
how can a sustainable economic 
model be built on the basis of polit­
ical expediency? Peru lacks an 
institutionalized party system; politi­
cal and social organizations, such as 
labor unions, are weak and un re­
sponsive, and Congress is little 
m ore than a rubber stamp for the 
president.
During his State of the Union 
address in July 1995, Fujimori 
acknowledged that “m odernization 
can be successful only if it reaches 
all members of society; this is the 
only way it can be expected to last 
into the fu ture .” To live up to these 
words, his adm inistration must 
define a long-term strategy that 
takes into account the redistributive 
aspects of m acroeconom ic growth.
M e x ic o : T h e  P o l it ic a l  
C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  P r iv a t iz a t io n  in  
a  C o r p o r a t is t  S y stem
The task of reform ing the 
Mexican state began in the mid- 
1980s, under the leadership of 
President Miguel de la Madrid. De 
la Madrid took office in the midst
of a severe economic crisis that 
called for drastic measures to stabi­
lize public finances. His adminis­
tration took the first steps toward 
neoliberal reform  by weaning the 
state away from nonstrategic eco­
nomic activities, such as the hotel 
industry.
Despite this limited progress, 
neoliberalism did not take root in 
Mexico until Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari became president in 1988. 
The Salinas adm inistration set out 
to complete the transition away 
from im port substitution to an 
outward-oriented model for eco­
nomic reform . This plan involved 
forfeiting the state’s regulatory 
functions to a free m arket economy.
Salinas encouraged privatization 
as a key ingredient in transform ing 
the paternalistic role of the 
Mexican state. Between 1982 and 
1993, de la M adrid and Salinas pri­
vatized 977 state companies. As in 
Peru, however, privatization in 
Mexico sparked trem endous con­
troversy am ong entrenched  interest 
groups. To push through the 
reform s deem ed necessary for 
Mexico’s economic survival, Salinas 
determ ined to dismantle the corpo­
ratist structures that for decades 
had negotiated social dem ands with 
the governing Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI).
Corporatism implies im portant 
mechanisms of representation, 
cooptation and control of key social 
groups, including workers, bureau­
crats, peasants, and civil and mili­
tary organizations. Since the PRI 
began its reign over Mexican poli­
tics in 1929, the party had consult­
ed these social groups when form u­
lating new policies. De la Madrid 
himself signed an economic solidar­
ity pact with labor, peasant and 
business organizations to legitimate 
the economic reform s of the 1980s. 
Salinas, in contrast, was determ ined 
to weaken the influence of this so- 
called “revolutionary family” over 
economic policy. His conflicts with
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traditional interest groups were 
reflected in the im prisonm ent of 
the oil industry’s union leader, the 
ouster of the long-time head of the 
teachers’ union, and the defection 
of many members of the PRI to the 
opposition.
Like Fujimori, Salinas sought 
legitimacy through social spending 
projects intimately associated with 
his name. There is still debate over 
the degree to which he used privati­
zation funds to finance his pet 
social program , the Programa 
N ational de Solidaridad. This pro­
gram poured funds into local pro­
jects such as clinics, roads and 
schools in low-income areas where 
the PRI lacked electoral support.
Salinas’ successor, Ernesto 
Zedillo, took office in December 
1994 amid a currency crisis of 
gigantic proportions. O ne of his 
first actions as president was to 
devalue the peso, and in the chaos 
that followed Mexico’s economic 
reform  program , whose success 
seemed assured under Salinas, 
became far less certain. As evi­
dence of corruption and misman­
agem ent m ounted, Salinas and 
many of his programs were discred­
ited, but the broad outlines of 
neoliberal reform  rem ained. As a 
result, Zedillo adopted a complicat­
ed and contradictory policy toward 
corporatism. He continued to pro­
mote a free m arket economy, while 
recognizing that a weakened corpo- 
ratist structure was essential for 
m aintaining political and social 
control. Privatization still played an 
im portant role in governm ent poli­
cy, but Zedillo favored granting 
concessions for key infrastructure 
projects (railroads, air- and sea­
ports, electricity and telecomm uni­
cations). He justified this practice 
as a means of improving productivi­
ty in sectors essential for economic 
development, although critics 
pointed to the need for a common 
criteria for the sales and disincorpo- 
ration process.
The 1994 economic crisis con­
vinced Mexico’s leadership of the 
need to consolidate the process of 
economic reform, despite wide­
spread popular discontent. To 
impose unpopular measures in a cli­
mate of political uncertainty and 
social mobilization, Zedillo and the 
PRI have become ever more author­
itarian, excluding the social sectors 
affected most from the debate over 
neoliberalism.
R e fo r m  o f  t h e  S ta te , P r iv a tiza tio n  
a n d  D e m o c r a t iz a t io n
Most scholars of economic and 
political liberalization in Latin 
America view this process as part of 
a simultaneous transition to both 
free markets and democracy, with 
one of the first steps being the rede­
finition of the size and role of the 
state. Privatization figures into this 
discussion as a key factor in reduc­
ing the state apparatus.
The redefinition of the state’s role 
in the economy is also a step toward 
political transformation. In this 
context, the reform  of the state has 
become a central part of the debate 
over the process of democratic tran­
sition in the region. However, there 
is a lack of discussion about the 
political effects of economic poli­
cies. Mexico and Peru are examples 
of states that have become leaner 
yet stronger due to neoliberal 
reforms, allowing the executive to 
reassert authoritarian tendencies.
The dismantling of public enter­
prises in Mexico and Peru has led to 
an increasingly exclusionary deci­
sion making process, an outcome 
that supports the thesis proposed by 
Stephan Haggard and Robert 
Kaufman in their book, The Politics 
of Economic Adjustment. These 
authors argue that the net political 
effect of economic adjustment pack­
ages is to concentrate power in the 
hands of the executive. The main 
difference between Mexico and 
Peru lies in the institutional aspects 
of their respective political systems.
Fujimori faced the challenge of cre­
ating an institutional structure that 
would enable the deadlocked 
Peruvian state to function effective­
ly; in contrast, three successive 
Mexican presidents struggled with 
the political consequences of eco­
nomic liberalization for the coun­
try’s corporatist system.
A comparison of Mexico and Peru 
brings im portant insights into the 
debate over the political effects of 
privatization in Latin America, espe­
cially as it concerns the construction 
of democratic institutions. In light 
of the evidence presented above, a 
tentative answer to the question as 
to whether privatization furthers the 
process of democratic transition is: 
no, it does not. Privatization is a 
finite process that will end once all 
the state-run companies in a partic­
ular country have been sold and 
infrastructure projects concessioned 
to the private sector. The revenues 
generated from privatization are a 
one-time bonus, and unfortunately 
are not always used to further the 
construction of democratic institu­
tions. Instead, in Mexico and Peru 
these funds have been exploited to 
subsidize and prom ote clientelist 
relationships. Programs such as 
Foncodes in Peru and Pronasol in 
Mexico have been presented as cor­
nerstones of social policy, whereas 
they are in fact mechanisms to 
coopt voters in key social or geo­
graphical areas. In addition to 
being tools of political patronage, 
these programs are short-term mea­
sures that have little impact on the 
larger structural problems of pover­
ty.
In conclusion, privatization as it 
has been im plem ented in Mexico 
and Peru seems to support the argu­
m ent that neoliberal reform  in 
Latin America has strengthened the 
presidency at the expense of democ­
ratic institutions. At least in the two 
countries in question, true reform  
of the state is far from complete; in 
fact, it has barely begun. ■
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S
lave labor remains one of 
the leading social calamities 
of the later twentieth centu­
ry. So many are the victims 
and the countries that vio­
late international conven­
tions prohibiting slavery that the UN 
has created a special group to study 
contemporary forms of slavery around 
the world.
Recendy, the group listed Brazil 
among the few countries practicing 
every form of modern slavery, includ­
ing child labor, debt bondage and the 
trade in women through international 
prostitution lings. The chief means of 
enslavement in Brazil is debt—the 
physical immobilization of workers on 
estates until they pay off debts 
incurred through their very working 
conditions. Workers in areas affected 
by recession or drought are lured into 
verbal contracts and transported thou­
sands of miles. Upon arrival at the 
plantation or factory, the wages 
promised them are forfeited to pay for 
transport costs, food and tools. As 
time passes, the workers’ debt grows, 
making it impossible for them to pay 
their way back home.
Ricardo Funari, 34, is a photograph­
er in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. For the 
last seven years he has collaborated 
with Impact Visuals, a New York photo 
agency that covers social issues around 
the world. He is currently working on 
a project to document contemporary 
forms of slavery in Latin America, 
including the exploitation of workers 
in the Brazilian rainforest.
Funari can be reached in Brazil at: 
tel. 55-21-265-0974, fax 55-21-556-2502, 
e-mail funari@ax.apc.org. He can also 
be contacted through Impact Visuals 
at: tel. 212-807-6622, fax 212-807-6644, 
e-mail impact@igc.apc.org. Many of 
his photos are posted on his Web site: 
h t tp //www.photobrazil.com. ■
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Brazil abolished slavery in 1888, but labor exploitation persists
Mute testimony of the dangers of the sisal defibering process.
Sisal is produced through an arduous defibering process. The machinery used for this task is rudim entary and dangerous; 
by some estimates, 1,500 workers have lost a finger, hand or arm in the defibering process in the state of Bahia alone.
Left: Workers load bales of sisal onto a waiting truck.
The sisal, or agave, plant was introduced to Brazil from Mexico early in this century. It was well suited to Brazil’s arid 
northeast, and the country soon became the world’s largest sisal producer. The sisal leaf produces a tough, resilient fiber 
used in the thread industry and by cattle breeders to tie hay bales. In recent decades, however, synthetic fibers have come 
to dom inate the international market. Synthetic fiber production requires m ore energy, employs fewer workers, and 
leaves behind toxic chemical residues.
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Workers tie sisal into bales. Cloth masks protect them from inhaling minute particles and fibers.
After defibering, sisal is sold to a “m ixer” to be softened. This process also involves many dangers for workers, who can 
claim few labor rights and rarely earn even half the m inimum wage (the equivalent of $100 a m onth in Brazil).
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Former rubber tappers, driven out o f the rainforest by economic hardship, earn a few  reais loading rubber onto a truck.
Brazil experienced its first rubber boom in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when European factories 
discovered the industrial uses of rubber. Brazilian rubber fell into decline shortly before World War I, when cheaper 
goods from Malaysia flooded the market, but Allied dem and during World War II revitalized production.
Since the 1970s, Brazil’s rubber tappers have attracted international attention for their efforts to protest exploitative 
working conditions. According to a 1992 study by Alison Sutton— Slavery in Brazil: A Link in the Chain of Modernisation—the 
owners of rubber plantations commonly claim exclusive rights over the sale of rubber produced on their lands. Sale of 
rubber to purchasers o ther than the plantation owner is grounds for eviction. Owners also require tappers to pay ren t in 
kind for the right to work on their properties, and may confiscate a worker’s possessions in return  for unpaid debts.
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A displaced rubber tapper flexes muscles acquired from lifting and stacking rubber slabs.
In the 1970s and 1980s, leaders such as Wilson Pinheiro de Souza and Chico Mendes helped form labor unions and 
other organizations to protect rubber tappers; both were assassinated in the violent battle for control of the Brazilian rain­
forest. The livelihood of rubber tappers in the states of Acre and Amazonas is further threatened by deforestation, timber 
companies and cattle ranching, which have had devastating effects on the environm ent and Brazil’s indigenous peoples.
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Although a variety of health problems and diseases are associated with the job, charcoal workers typically lack protective gear such as 
masks, boots or gloves.
Charcoal production is probably one of the hardest and dirtiest jobs on the planet. In addition to these hazards, charcoal 
workers may be cheated of their pay by bosses who plead financial hardships or accounting problems. Workers in this situ­
ation have few legal resources; unions advise hiring a lawyer, but most workers cannot even afford the bus fare into town. 
Complicating the situation further is the fact that many rural workers are illiterate, and in some cases sign docum ents they 
do no t understand.
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The characteristic round brick ovens used in charcoal production dot an arid landscape 
in Mato Grosso do Sul.
Charcoal is produced by burning wood inside walk-in brick ovens. The sharp 
variations in tem perature inside and outside the ovens, as well as the hazards of 
inhaling charcoal dust, produce a high incidence of pneum onia am ong charcoal 
workers.
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Dwarfed by his burden, a worker loads charcoal onto a truck.
Charcoal production is a long, exhausting task. Adults and children alike work 12-14 hour days an average of six days a 
week. They usually start two hours before daybreak and continue through dusk.
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Workers arriving at a cane field in the state of Bahia. For the next six months, they will be effectively imprisoned on the plantation 
through debt to its owner.
Conditions on Brazil’s sugar cane plantations are reminiscent of an earlier era in Latin American history, when slaves and 
peons labored in the fields of the great fazendas. Nowadays, labor contractors, or gatos, recruit workers from other states 
with promises of good working conditions and high wages. The gato pays for travel expenses and food (usually bread and 
soft drinks) along the way, so that the worker arrives at the plantation already in debt.
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Harvesting sugar cane is backbreaking work. Each stalk is ait by hand with a machete.
Once workers arrive on the cane plantation, they slide deeper and deeper into 
debt. They pay to sleep in filthy barracks, the only shelter available, and for the 
machetes and sharpening stones used to harvest the cane.
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Workers line up for the only meal of the day. The price of these meager rations is 
deducted from their salaries.
The company deducts the only meal served daily from the workers’ pay. O ther 
provisions, available only from the company store, are sold at inflated prices.
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The long stalks of cane are gathered into bundles and transported by truck to the mills 
where they will be processed into sugar.
Indebted workers are effectively napped on the plantations, since they cannot 
afford the trip back home. The company provides transportation only at the end 
of the cutting period, which runs from September through March. Workers leave 
their identity papers at the company office, which won’t release them until all out­
standing debts have been paid.
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A Capitalist Revolution?
Eduardo A. Gamarra
The Capitalist Revolution in Latin 
America
by Paul Craig Roberts and 
Karen LaFollette Araujo 
New York: Oxford University Press,
1997. 213 pages. $25.
eoliberalism's impact 
on Latin America and 
the Caribbean has 
been widely debated. 
As this issue of 
Hemisphere shows, how­
ever, critics have proposed few viable 
alternatives to the market reforms of 
the past two decades. Even the left, 
with a few caveats about social costs, 
has accepted the basic premises of 
neoliberal reform (see Andres 
Oppenheimer’s commentary in this issue).
A whole library of significant case 
studies and theoretical discussions 
about neoliberalism is now available. 
Among this vast collection, a few 
works aim less to improve scholar­
ship on the issue and more to raise 
polemic and controversy. The main 
objective of such works appears to be 
to rewrite Latin American history 
within a simplistic framework that 
gloats over the demise of the left and 
blames the region’s ills on its cultur­
al legacy. The best known example 
is El manual del perfecto idiota lati- 
noamericano (Barcelona: Plaza y 
Janes, 1996), the Latin American 
bestseller which derides the left and 
obscures any negative consequences 
of market-oriented reforms. In the
Eduardo Gamarra is editor of 
Hemisphere and director of graduate 
programs at the Latin American and 
Caribbean Center• at Florida International 
University.
same genre is The Capitalist Revolution 
in Latin America, by Paul Craig 
Roberts and Karen LaFollette 
Araujo.
The basic premise of this book is 
that in the late twentieth century, 
Latin America—guided by Chile’s 
enlightened generals—woke up and 
discovered capitalism. The adoption 
of capitalism in the past decade 
thrust Latin America into the mod­
ern world, and only higher and high­
er doses of neoliberalism will compel 
it to abandon its “rent-seeking” past. 
To achieve the final goals of the capi­
talist revolution, the authors argue, 
Latin America must also undergo a 
fundamental cultural shift, abandon­
ing the Catholic and Spanish her­
itage responsible for the region’s 
socialist/protectionist legacy. Finally, 
Roberts and Araujo advocate the 
elimination of development banks, 
such as the World Bank, based on 
the rationale that the only financing 
that should be allowed in a capitalist 
global economy is the “kind that 
relates to risk and reward” (p. 182).
Three ideas put forth by Roberts 
and Araujo merit further discussion: 
first, the notion that Latin America is 
experiencing capitalism for the first 
time; second, the pervasive view that 
military dictatorships were necessary 
stages in the capitalist revolution; 
and finally, the idea that all neoliber­
al reformers w ere/are unimpeach­
able revolutionaries.
D isc o v e r in g  C apitalism  in  t h e  L ate 
T w e n t ie t h  C e n t u r y ?
One of the least theoretically 
sound arguments in The Capitalist 
Revolution in Latin America is the 
notion that Latin America discov­
ered capitalism in the late twentieth 
century. According to this view, all
The
C apitalist
R evolution
L atin
A m erica
Paul C ra i^  R oberts Sc K aren  Lafollelte A raujo 
Foreword by Peter Bauer
W ..
of the economic experim ents of the 
past hundred  years were not capital­
ist. Instead, Latin America was 
characterized by the active presence 
of the state and the ubiquitous 
“ren t seekers,” who behaved in pre­
capitalist ways.
This argum ent ignores the fact 
that capitalism has taken many dif­
ferent forms and shapes around the 
world. In the case of Latin America, 
capitalist market forces have been at 
work since at least the late 1800s. 
That domestic policy makers were 
unfit managers and that Latin 
American businesses were not risk 
takers is probably true, but capital­
ism undeniably had a great impact 
on the region well before the second 
half of the twentieth century.
If capitalism only reached Latin 
America in the 1970s, with the aid of 
General Augusto Pinochet, then US 
policy goals in the region since at 
least the end of World War II seem
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A controversial take on the origins of neoliberalism
downright puzzling. Were the mili­
tary-authoritarian regimes of the 
1970s anticapitalist? What about US 
policies that aimed to promote 
import substitution strategies, or for­
eign (and especially US) businesses 
that bolstered precisely those “rent 
seekers” whom the authors loathe?
Roberts and Araujo would have us 
believe that any degree of state 
involvement in the economy can be 
equated with anticapitalism. If that 
is the case, then the capitalist revolu­
tion must also have bypassed the US 
until the end of the New Deal and 
the onset of the Reagan Revolution. 
The authors repeat the simplistic 
dogma that any state intervention is 
negative, and that only markets dri­
ven by private sector ingenuity will 
rescue Latin America from itself. 
They fail to recognize that the capi­
talist revolution itself was state- 
driven; in many instances, the move 
toward more open economies and 
major structural reforms went 
against the wishes of the private sec­
tor. Even today, the private sector in 
Latin America fears competition and 
often calls for a return to state pro­
tection. Moreover, as the current 
Asian crisis shows, when neoliberal­
ism or any other form of capitalist 
experiment fails, the private sector 
always turns to the public sector—in 
the form of state or multilateral 
agencies—to bail it out. All the talk 
about deregulation and market
forces seems superfluous at a time 
when massive loans from Washington 
and international financial institu­
tions are bolstering neoliberal 
economies in countries like Mexico 
and Korea.
W ere  D ic ta to r s  R f.a i .i y  t h a t  B a d ?
The last decade has seen a general 
acceptance of the qualified state­
m ent that General Pinochet and the 
Chilean generals violated hum an 
rights but left behind a successful 
economic experiment worthy of 
emulation. Most analysts on the left 
and the right agree that neoliberal­
ism’s principal reforms are neces­
sary, but must be carried out by 
democratic governments. Roberts’ 
and Araujo’s endorsem ent of the 
Pinochet model suggests that the 
relationship between neoliberalism 
and democracy is not necessarily pos­
itive. After all, authoritarian regimes 
do not have to deal with unruly 
labor unions or undisciplined politi­
cal parties, or negotiate with a dis­
ruptive legislature. In fact, in the 
past decade, many countries that 
adopted market reforms opted for 
authoritarian-like decision making 
mechanisms to im plement these 
measures. Unions were busted, 
union leaders jailed, and, in some 
cases, states of siege imposed to con­
trol dissenting voices. Lest we forget, 
with the exception of Pinochet,
Latin America’s military-authoritari­
an experiments were largely 
responsible for the economic col­
lapse of the 1980s.
The most objectionable aspect 
of The Capitalist Revolution in Latin 
America is its unqualified endorse­
m ent of General Pinochet and the 
Chilean path to neoliberalism. 
According to the authors: The anti- 
capitalist left has demonized General 
Augusto Pinochet, whose government 
ruled Chile for almost seventeen years, 
and left as its legacy a constitutional 
democracy. During his reign, Pinochet 
had to confront organized terrorists. 
Repressions were moderate compared to 
those that Castro inflicted on Cuba for 
example, or that characterized political 
violence in Argentina and Peru... We 
believe that Pinochet ivas singled out 
because he doubly sinned, adding mar- 
ketization to political repression of the 
left (p. 9).
Even the most recalcitrant 
Chilean leftist recognizes that 
neoliberal reforms in Chile were 
successful and have served as a 
model for the rest of the region. 
But few, even those on the 
extreme right, would justify the 
large-scale repression as a neces­
sary cleansing process to eliminate 
“terrorists.” Have Roberts and 
Araujo forgotten that Pinochet 
overthrew a constitutional democ­
racy and carried out a systematic 
pattern of repression that included 
form er government officials, such 
as Orlando Letelier, who was m ur­
dered on the streets of 
Washington, D.C. by the military 
regim e’s henchmen? To credit 
Pinochet for the democratization 
of Chile is also ludicrous. Even a 
cursory survey of Chilean politics 
in the late 1980s reveals that the 
military regime resisted any demo­
The authors repeat the simplistic dogma that any state interven­
tion is negative and that only markets driven by private sector 
ingenuity urill rescue Latin America from itself They fail to rec­
ognize that the capitalist revolution itself was state-driven.
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iEENN STATE PRESS■cratic opening. The still-restricted nature of Chilean democracy, includ­
ing built-in military prerogatives and 
occasional coup threats, suggests that 
the transition is far from complete.
A ll  N f.o i .tbkr at. R efo rm ers  
a re  G o o d
A final simplistic view furthered by 
The Capitalist Revolution in Latin 
America is its unqualified praise for 
civilian capitalist revolutionaries.
Few would deny the merits of the 
reform programs carried out in 
Carlos M enem’s Argentina, Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari’s Mexico or 
Alberto Fujimori's Peru. These 
reforms ended hyperinflation, 
restored economic growth and 
implemented necessary structural 
adjustment measures. Neoliberal 
ideologues, however, conveniently 
gloss over the excesses of such 
reforms.
Serious examination of the privati­
zation experiments in Argentina, for 
example, reveals the extremely high 
levels of corruption that character­
ized the sale of state enterprises. 
Those who have studied the privati­
zation process in Mexico have 
reached similar conclusions. Yet, 
Roberts and Araujo seem to insist 
that only public sector officials who 
solicit bribes are corrupt; they have 
little to say about the private sector— 
both foreign and domestic—that 
pays up. When privatized industries 
face turmoil, their new owners do 
not hesitate to run to the state for 
protection.
In the final analysis, The Capitalist 
Revolution in Latin America, like all 
good polemics, is filled with simplis­
tic statements, ideological axes to 
grind and unfeasible proposals. 
Beyond the rhetorical appeal to 
those who agree that General 
Pinochet is an honorable Latin 
American revolutionary, this book 
provides no significant contribution 
to a better understanding of the his­
tory of the region in the past 
decade. ■
Through Corridors of 
Power
Institutions and Civil-Military 
Relations in Argentina 
DAVID PION-BERLIN
Through Corridors of 
Power examines the 
influence that insti­
tutions have had 
over the im plem en­
tation o f policy in 
Argentina, revealing 
that policies can 
succeed despite 
military resistance.
Pion-Berlin draws 
both on archival 
sources and on in­
terviews with some 
one hundred  civil­
ian and military figures to show how political 
discussion occurs. “An innovative and 
thoughtful analysis of the interaction o f civil­
ian and military elites in Argentina’s ‘new’ 
democracy.” —-J. Samuel Fitch,
University o f Colorado at Boulder 
2 6 4  pages 4 illus tra tions $17 .9 5  paper
Drugs and Security in 
the Caribbean
Sovereignty Under Siege 
IVELAW LLO YD GRIFFITH
“This study is an 
urgen t and compel­
ling work. Com plete 
and authoritative, it 
is unique in its 
wealth o f detail, 
presented in a clear 
analytical fram e­
work. It fully makes 
the case that drugs 
are a ‘clear and 
present danger’ to 
Caribbean countries 
which threaten to 
destroy their economy, their democratic insti­
tutions, and the stability o f society. It is an elo­
quen t call for action.”
—Ambassador Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Director, 
North-South Center, University o f Miami 
3 7 6 pages 7 illus tra tions $16 .9 5  paper
Strategy, Security, and 
Spies
Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in 
World War II
MARIA EMILIA PAZ
“This is a carefully 
crafted work that 
exploits newly avail­
able materials from 
the files o f the CIA,
FBI, NSA, and U.S.
Army and Navy in­
telligence. It is an 
insightful analysis 
o f the factors that 
ham pered effective 
cooperation be­
tween Mexico and 
the U nited States 
during  the Second W orld War. T he story that 
Dr. Paz relates is eye-opening and will inform 
even specialists in the field.”
—Charles Am eringer, Penn State University 
2 7 6  pages 10 illus tra tions $ 1 9 .9 5  paper
The Peruvian 
Labyrinth
Polity, Society, Economy
E d it e d  b y  MAXWELL A. CAMERON a n d
PHILIP MAUCERI
W it h  a  F o r e w o r d  b y  C y n t h ia  M c C l in t o c k  a n d  
A b r a h a m  L o w e n t h a l
The Peruvian Laby­
rinth brings 
together a new 
generation of schol­
ars to explore the 
multifaceted Peru­
vian “experim ent” 
as it has evolved 
further, in often 
dram atic ways, in 
the 1980s and 
1990s. C ontributors 
are Carm en Rosa 
Balbi, Maxwell A. Cam eron, Carlos Ivan 
Degregori, Francisco Durand, Christine 
Hunefeldt, Philip Mauceri, Kenneth Roberts 
and Mark Peceny, and 
Carol Wise.
28 8  pages $ 1 9 .9 5  paper
Available in bookstores, o r from
PENN STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS • USB 1, Suite C • University Park, PA 16802-1003 
Orders: 1- 800 - 326-9180 • FAX 814-863-1408 • http://www.psu.edu/psupress
Strategy, 
Security, 
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Veoliberalism in Latin America
Marian Goslinga
N
eoliberalism has 
been the dom inant 
ideology governing 
Latin American eco­
nomics, politics and 
society in the latter 
part of the twentieth century. Yet, 
as most sources agree, the neoliber­
al m odel has lost support or, at the 
very least, been subtly m odified by 
the social realities of the hem i­
sphere.
Some of the larger countries in 
the region, including Brazil, 
Argentina and Mexico, have been 
experim enting with their own 
brands of neoliberalism  and have, 
as the literature will testify, found a 
fairly successful form ula. Smaller 
countries, such as Bolivia, Peru  and 
Paraguay, have also developed their 
own versions of neoliberal strate­
gies.
The following is a list of titles 
dealing with neoliberalism —includ­
ing m onographs and periodical 
articles—published within the last 
few years. Many of these works 
focus on the controversial relation­
ship between neoliberalism  and 
democracy. Economic reform s 
have strained newly elected dem oc­
ratic governm ents across Latin 
America, severely testing the viabili­
ty of the neoliberal doctrine.
A good source of articles on this 
topic is volume 24, num ber 1 of 
Latin American Perspectives (January 
1997), which is devoted in its 
entirety to a discussion of neoliber­
alism.
Marian Goslinga is the Latin American 
and Caribbean librarian at Florida 
International University.
El neoliberalismo hoy: debate y 
realidades. Revista Economia 
Informa (March 1997): 3-53. 
[Presents various viewpoints on 
neoliberal econom ic theory and 
practice and its effects, with a spe­
cific focus on Mexico. Includes a 
selected bibliography.]
Social Power and the Inflation o f  
Discourse: The Failure o f Popular 
Hegemony in Nicaragua. B.L.
Artz. Latin American Perspectives, v. 
24, no. 1 (January 1997): 92-113. 
[Criticizes poststructuralism  and 
the idea of the “end of ideology” 
in the works o f Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe and leading 
Nicaraguan theorists.]
Neoliberalism and Income 
Distribution in Latin America. W.
Baer, W. Maloney. World 
Development, v. 25, no. 3 (March 
1997): 311-327. [Reviews the p rin­
cipal neoliberal policy measures 
instituted in Latin America in the 
last decade and their im pact on 
econom ic inequality.]
The Reconquest o f Central 
America: Latin American Studies 
and the Transition to Democracy, 
1979-1990. M.T. Berger. Latin 
American Perspectives, v. 24, no. 1 
(January 1997): 7-72. [An effort 
to trace the relationship between 
the Latin Am erican Studies profes­
sion, U nited States hegem ony and 
neoliberalism ’s resurgence in Latin 
America. Includes an extensive 
bibliography.]
Can Neoliberalism Survive in 
Latin America? G. Bird, A.
Helvege. Millennium, v. 26, no. 1 
(1997): 31-56. [Investigates the
factors leading to the adoption of 
neoliberal policies and identifies 
the threats to their continued  
im plem entation. Predicts that the 
in teraction  between balance of 
payments problem s, incom e distri­
bution and econom ic growth will 
create significant difficulties for 
Latin Am erican econom ies over 
the next few years, and that neolib­
eralism, if it is to survive, must 
address key issues such as the role 
of the state.]
Nicaragua and Guyana: Conflicts 
and Reforms. F.J. Carroll. Forum 
for Applied Research and Public Policy, 
v. 12 (Spring 1997): 79-86.
Tilting at Neoliberalism. L.
Conger. The Institutional Investor, v. 
31, no. 5 (May 1997): 91-103. [A 
group of Latin Am erican leftists 
gather in Mexico City in February 
1996, claiming to have a better 
alternative to the econom ic m odel 
that has dom inated the region d u r­
ing the last decade.]
Neoliberalismo, dialogos y otros 
temas. Jose Consuegra Higgins. 
Barranquilla, Colombia: 
Universidad Simon Bolivar, 1996. 
107 pp.
Haiti in the New World Order:
The Limits o f the Democratic 
Revolution. Alex Dupuy. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1997. 220 pp. 
[Includes a chapter entitled, “A 
Neoliberal Model for Post-Duvalier 
H aiti.”]
Shipwreck and Survival: The Left 
in Central America. C. Figueroa 
Ibarra. Translated by Jo h n  F. 
Uggen. Latin American Perspectives,
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Publications Update: Neoliberalism in Latin America
v. 24 (January 1997): 114-129. 
[Guatem alan sociologist analyzes 
the results of neoliberal policies on 
the Central Am erican left.]
Relocating Class: Ex-Miners and 
Neoliberalism in Bolivia. L. Gill.
Critique of Anthropology, v. 17, no. 3 
(1997): 293-312.
Democracy and Neoliberalism in 
the Developing World: Lessons 
from the Anglophone Caribbean.
Clifford E. Griffin. Brookfield, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing, 1997. 239 pp.
Post-1982 Effects o f Neoliberalism  
on Latin American Development 
and Poverty: Two Conflicting 
Views. H uddle D.L. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, v. 
45, no. 4 (1997): 881-897. [Review 
article of Sebastian Edwards' Crisis 
and Reform in Latin America: From 
Despair to Hope (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) and 
Duncan G reen’s Silent Revolution: 
The Rise of Market Economies in Latin 
America (London: Latin American 
Bureau, 1995).]
“Fujipopulism” and the Liberal 
State in Peru, 1990-1995. B.H.
Kay. Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs, v. 38 (W inter 
1996-1997): 55-98.
Globalization and Neoliberalism: 
The Caribbean Context. Thom as 
Klak. Lanham , MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1997.
Fast Forward: Latin America on 
the Edge o f the Twenty-First 
Century. Scott B. MacDonald, 
Georges A. Fauriol. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1997. 318 pp.
Alternatives to Neoliberalism in 
Latin America. J. Petras. Latin 
American Perspectives, v. 24, no. 1 
(January 1997): 80-91. [Discusses 
neoliberalism ’s inability to contain
and influence popular struggles, 
given the gap between the elec­
toral process and popular socio­
econom ic interests.]
The Third Wave o f Modernization 
in Latin America: Cultural 
Perspectives on Neoliberalism.
Lynne Phillips. W ilmington, DE: 
Scholarly Resources, 1997. [Vol.
16 in the popular series, “Jaguar 
Books on Latin A m erica.”]
Neoliberalism and the Sociology o f  
Development: Emerging Trends 
and Unanticipated Facts.
Alejandro Portes. Population and 
Development Review, v. 23, no. 2 
(1997): 229-259.
The Political Economy o f Neo- 
Liberal Reform in Latin America:
A Critical Appraisal. D.G.
Richards. Capital &  Class, no. 6 
(Spring 1997): 19-43.
The Capitalist Revolution in Latin 
America. Paul C. Roberts, Karen 
L. Araujo. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 214 pp. 
[Reviewed in this issue.]
Politics, Social Change, and 
Economic Restructuring in Latin 
America. William C. Smith, 
Roberto P. Korzeniewicz, eds.
Coral Gables, FL: North-South 
Center. D istributed by Lynn 
R ienner Publishers, 1997. 263 pp. 
[Collection of essays on contem po­
rary Latin Am erican economics, 
politics and society.]
Neoliberalism and the 
Transformation o f Mexican 
Authoritarianism. Jud ith
Teichman. Mexican Studies/Estudios 
Mexicanos, v. 13, no. 1 (W inter 
1997): 121-147. [Argues that 
recen t neoliberal reform s h^ve 
been instrum ental in eroding the 
two pillars of the Mexican au thori­
tarian state: corporatism  and politi­
cal patronage.]
Give Me Discipline and Give Me 
Death: Neoliberalism and Health 
in Chile. R. Trum per, L. Phillips.
International Journal of Health 
Services, v. 27, no. 1 (1997): 41-55. 
[Examines neoliberal reform  of 
the Chilean health  care system, 
which the authors argue is charac­
terized by harsh and even violent 
inequalities.]
El neoliberalismo en America 
Latina: Crisis y alternativas. Jose 
Valenzuela Feijoo. La Paz, Bolivia: 
Editorial Punto Cero, 1997. 152 
pp. [Examines neoliberal econom ­
ics in theory  and practice, as well 
as possible alternatives in Latin 
America.]
Neoliberalism and Class Conflict 
in Latin America: A Comparative 
Perspective on the Political 
Economy o f Structural Adjustment.
H enry Veltmeyer, Jam es Petras, 
Steve Vieux. New York, NY: St. 
M artin’s Press; 1997. 258 pp.
Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in 
Latin America: Unexpected  
Affinities. K. Weyland. Studies in 
Comparative International 
Development, v. 31, no. 3 (Fall 
1996): 3-31. [Points ou t the 
underlying affinities between 
neoliberalism  and new versions of 
populism  in Latin America, with 
special em phasis on leaders such 
as Carlos Saul M enem, Fernando 
Collor de Mello and Alberto 
Fujimori.]
El modelo neoliberal y su impacto 
en la sociedad colombiana.
Consuelo Ahum ada. Bogota: El 
Ancora Editores, 1996. 303 pp. 
[Argues that neoliberalism  in 
Colombia is the product of exter­
nal factors, and traces the origins 
o f the so-called “Chicago Boys”— 
the technocrats who support 
neoliberal reform  and have 
clashed with the old guard over 
control o f the state.] ■
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Publications Update: Neol
v. 24 (January 1997): 114- 
[Guatem alan sociologist a 
the results of neoliberal p 
the Central Am erican left,
Relocating Class: Ex-Mi m 
Neoliberalism in Bolivia.
Critique of Anthropology, v. ] 
(1997): 293-312.
Democracy and Neolibera 
the Developing World: Lt 
from the Anglophone Car
Clifford E. Griffin. Brook 
Ashgate Publishing, 1997.
Post-1982 Effects o f Neol 
on Latin American Develc 
and Poverty: Two Conflic 
Views. H uddle D.L. Econ 
Development and Cultural C 
45, no. 4 (1997): 881-897 
article of Sebastian Edwar 
and Reform in Latin Americ 
Despair to Hope (New York: 
University Press, 1995) an 
Duncan G reen’s Silent Rei 
The Rise of Market Economu 
America (London: Latin /  
Bureau, 1995).]
“Fujipopulism” and the L 
State in Peru, 1990-1995.
Kay. Journal of Interameria 
and World Affairs, v. 38 (W 
1996-1997): 55-98.
Globalization and Neolibc 
The Caribbean Context. 1
Klak. Lanham , MD: Row 
Littlefield, 1997.
Fast Forward: Latin Amei 
the Edge o f the Twenty-Fi 
Century. Scott B. MacDo 
Georges A. Fauriol. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transactii 
Publishers, 1997. 318 pp.
Alternatives to Neoliberal 
Latin America. J. Petras.
American Perspectives, v. 24. 
(January 1997): 80-91. [1 
neoliberalism ’s inability t<
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FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITYS 
INTERCULTURAL DANCE AND MUSIC INSTITUTE
presents in  collaboration with the Florida Dance Association 
and the Florida Dance Festival the...
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN 
SUMMER DANCE INSTITUTE
T he 1998 Slimmer Institute offers an exciting week of intensive study opportunities for students, artists, schol­ars, teachers, and others interested in studying the dance, 
music and distinctive cultural traditions of Latin America, the 
Caribbean and the African Diaspora. Two separate and concur­
ren t Intensive programs are com bined with dance technique 
classes, seminars, panel discussions, and informal gatherings to 
offer participants the opportunity to network and engage in an 
exciting dialogue and exchange with artists and scholars of these 
culturally rich areas of the world. We hope you will jo in  us as we 
dance to the beat o f the bata drum ; sing the songs of the 
Orishas; sip cafe con leche with guava pastelitos in the meeting 
and networking sessions; and experience heart-pounding perfor­
mances by some of Miami's most exciting cultural dance compa­
nies.
Technique classes in Haitian, Afro-Cuban, Afro-Brazilian, 
Afro-Caribbean, and African dance and drum m ing with 
internationally recognized artists and teachers
Panel discussions with distinguished scholars in the field
*•" Teacher Training Intensive in “Critical Issues in Intercultural 
Arts Education: Africa and the Diaspora”
Intensive academic course in “Dance and Culture of Africa 
and the Diaspora”
Evening perform ances, including Ife-Ile Dance and Music 
Ensemble (M iam i/Cuba); Ayabonmbe (M iam i/Haiti); Iroko 
Afro-Cuban Dance Theater (M iam i/Cuba); and Juanita Baro 
and Drummers
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Studies Program and 
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For further information, contact:
Susan Caraballo 
INDAMI Program Coordinator 
Florida International University 
University Park, DM 353 
Miami, Florida 33199 
Tel: 305-348-2894 
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E-mail: indami @fiu. edu
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AmskimsNet
P ro m o tin g  H e m isp h e r ic  In te g ra tio n
AmericasNet at http://www.am ericasnet.net is your single 
---- Internet resource fo r official information about the upcoming 
Santiago Summit o f the Americas.The government o f Chile 
will host this second Presidential Summit, April 18-19, 1998.
J  ^ F o r  business leaders, government delegates, media
representatives, students o r anyone seeking centralized 
'rb. information about the Presidential Summit,
AmericasNet provides up-to-date events 
calendars, reports, position papers, analysis 
and much more.
y  AmericasNet was developed 
jointly by leading technology 
corporations: BellSouth, 
Hewlett-Packard and 
Microsoft, in partnership 
w ith the Latin American 
and Caribbean Center 
8  ' (LACC) o f Florida
International University (FIU) 
Miami, the Faculty o f Latin 
American Social Sciences 
(FLACSO-Chile) and Diego Portales 
University (UDP) at Santiago, Chile.
For your d irect link to  the Presidential 
Summit visit AmericasNet at 
http://www.am ericasnet.net 
— where the Americas connect in promoting 
Hemispheric Integration.
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